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Joint Ventures in the USSR, Czechoslovakia and Poland
Georgios N. Boukaouris *t
I. INTRODUCTION
it is beyond doubt that international trade has undergone tremendous
development. It now is a dominant factor in international economic
cooperation regardless of the social and political systems of the countries
involved. Until the end of the 1960s, international business transactions
were primarily performed on the basis of bilateral industrial cooperation
agreements. After a certain period this framework was no longer suffi-
cient; consequently, the concept of joint ventures emerged as a necessity.
Creation of a joint venture offers something more than mere cooper-
ation. It offers the primordial advantage of sharing between partners
from different countries. This sharing involves common business under-
takings, management activities, programming, goals and profits; and
most of all common risks and responsibilities. All of these appear very
tempting to businessmen.
This Article will focus on the legal framework for joint ventures in
three major socialist countries: the USSR, Czechoslovakia and Poland.
* Attorney and Counselor at Law; Member of the Athens Bar, Greece; Professional Represen-
tative before the European Patent Office, Munich; LL.M., Institute of Comparative Law, McGill
University. The present Article is based on material and research undertaken for the author's LL.M.
thesis under the same title. Part of it was also used in a seminar conducted by the author on March
16, 1988 at the Institute of Comparative Law of McGill University, under the topic "Joint Venture
Legislation in the U.S.S.R. and Other Socialist States." The information provided is current as of
July 15, 1988.
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It will compare specific points of each country's legislation regarding the
creation, operation and dissolution of the joint venture.
II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF SOVIET, CZECHOSLOVAK AND
POLISH FOREIGN TRADE
A. Early Period: The Forgotten First Joint Ventures
On April 22, 1918 the Council of the People's Commissars of the
RSFSR issued a short Decree, entitled "Decree on the Nationalization of
Foreign Trade."1 Article 1 of the Decree declared that "all foreign trade
is nationalized." The Decree further provided that any foreign trade ac-
tivity would be carried out by state agencies under the control of the
People's Commissariat of Trade and Industry.2 After the USSR was
formed in December 1922, the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade
became an all-union body and its powers were extended to cover the en-
tire USSR by virtue of the Decree of July 13, 1923.' Thus, the whole
foreign trade sector became a state monopoly.
However, this monopoly did not continue. In the early twenties,
under Lenin's New Economic Policy ("NEP"), the idea of decentralizing
foreign trade and abolishing state monopoly emerged.' The idea was
supported at first sight by a number of Politburo members, such as Zi-
noviev, Kamenev, Bukharin, even Stalin, but not by Trotsky. This policy
was "almost hysterical[ly]" 5 rejected by Lenin himself. In this period of
initial revolutionary enthusiasm, Lenin considered the state monopoly of
foreign trade to be a weapon which would enable Russia to become an
industrial power.6 Conversely, a Decree of March 13, 1922, entitled "On
Foreign Trade," had already begun to depart from the principle of mo-
nopoly. First, the Decree allowed for direct importing and exporting by
state enterprises, provincial executive committees and all-Russian coop-
eratives, provided that permission for each transaction was obtained
from the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade. Second, something
nearly forgotten today, it allowed for the creation and organization of the
I The text of the Decree is translated into English by John Quigley and is included as Appendix
B in J. QUIGLEY, THE SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE MONOPOLY: INSTITUTIONS AND LAWS 202 (1974).
Reference to the text of the Decree is made as well in W. E. BUTLER, SOVIET LAW 333 (1983), and
in Dore, Plan and Contract in the Domestic and Foreign Trade of the USSR., 8 SYRACUSE J. INT'L
L. & COM. 29, 75 (1980).
2 J. QUIGLEY, supra note 1, at 202. In June 1920, the People's Commissariat of Trade and
Industry was renamed the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade. Id. at 22.
3 W.E. BUTLER, supra note 1, at 333.
4 Hough, Attack on Protectionism in the Soviet Union? A Comment, 40 INT'L ORG. 495 (1986).
5 Id.
6 Id.
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first Soviet joint ventures.7 These mixed enterprises could be formed
with the participation of Narkomvneshtorg' or its organs and foreign
enterprises, either in the USSR or abroad. The joint ventures could un-
dertake export-import operations as well as produce and supply export
goods.9 This structuring proved to be very effective in practice. Thus, in
1924 the mixed companies accounted for 4.3% of Soviet exports, and
4.5% of Soviet imports."0 In 1925, there were 161 mixed enterprises,
twelve of which involved the participation of foreign corporations. These
twelve enterprises provided approximately 20% of the total capital, an
amount equal to 3.4 million rubles."
Unbelievable as it might seem today, Stalin was not opposed to joint
ventures in the early period following Lenin's death in 1924, when he
ruled the USSR together with Rykov, Kamenev and Zinoviev. On Au-
gust 17, 1927 a specific law on Joint Stock Companies, also regulating
mixed companies in the USSR, came into force. 2 When Stalin was able
to attain uncontested power in 1929,13 however, he started imposing
harsh collectivization and centralization measures. As a result of his
general economic policy during these times, the situation abruptly
changed. In 1930, the Sixteenth Communist Party Congress ordered the
liquidation of the joint stock and mixed companies.' 4 In February 1930,
7 Note that this Decree has not been repealed. See Loeber, Capital Investment in Soviet Enter-
prises? Possibilities and Limits of East-West Trade, 6 ADEL. L. REv. 337, 352 (1977-1978).
8 This is the Russian abbreviation of the words Narodnyi Komissariat Vneshnei Torgovli (Peo-
ple's Commissariat of Foreign Trade).
9 Voznesenskaja, Pravovye Formy Sovmestnogo Predprinimatelstva i Praktika SSSR (Legal
Forms of Joint Undertaking and the U.S.S.R. Practice), SovETsKoE GOSUDARsTVO I PRAVO (So-
VIET STATE AND LAW) 59, 64 (Mar. 1985) [hereinafter Voznesenskaja 1985]. See also J. QUIGLEY,
supra note 1, at 27; Smirnov, Joint Ventures in the US.S.R., FOREIGN TRADE No. 9, at 42 (1987)
[hereinafter Smirnov 1987]. Smirnov points out that the joint ventures today "[are not], strictly
speaking, an entirely new form coming into use, but, we might say, the reinvigoration of the known
practice of undertaking joint ventures inside the U.S.S.R." The existence of joint ventures in the
Soviet Union at that time is mentioned also in M. I. Goldman & M. Goldman, Soviet and Chinese
Economic Reform, FOREIGN AFi'. No. 66, at 551, 564 (1987).
10 Loeber, supra note 7, at 344.
11 Id; J. QUIGLEY, supra note 1, at 47.
12 Loeber, supra note 7, at 345; Voznesenskaja 1985, supra note 9, at 64.
13 B. D. WOLFE, THREE WHO MADE A REVOLUTION: A BIOGRAPHICAL HISTORY 467
(1984).
14 It should be stressed at this point that the abolition of the first Soviet joint ventures in 1930
did not prevent Soviet state enterprises or agencies from getting involved in direct or indirect invest-
ment in developed or developing countries abroad. An elaborate study of the investment undertaken
by Soviet and other Eastern European countries abroad is found in C. H. MCMILLAN, MULTINA-
TIONALS FROM THE SECOND WORLD (1987). See also MNCs and Joint Ventures: Not All Are West-
to-East, XVI Business Eastern Europe (Business International S.A.) No. 26, at 205 (June 29, 1987).
Two well-known examples of such investment are: the Armtorg Trading Corporation, New York;
and the Moscow Narodny Bank Limited, established in 1919. Both of these companies are 100%
Soviet-owned. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOVIET LAW 324 (2d ed. 1985); Pfeffer, The Business Activities of
State Trading Enterprises in Countries with Market Economies - The Reconciling of the Differing
1989]
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thirty export and import organizations with monopoly rights for deter-
mined categories of goods, called "all-union combines," replaced the
abolished joint ventures, from which many of them were formed." As a
result, Soviet foreign trade slowly but steadily became centralized
again.16 It is worth noting, however, that the 1927 Law was not repealed
until 1962, after the adoption of the Fundamental Principles of Civil Law
in 1961.1
7
The fundamental axiom of state monopoly of foreign trade was
maintained and reinforced by Stalin through its integration into the 1936
Soviet Constitution. Today the monopoly is still in force under article
73(10) of the 1977 Soviet Constitution.1
On August 24, 1953 the Ministry of Foreign Trade was created.
The Ministry assumed responsibility for the overall coordination of So-
viet foreign trade under the Gosplan.1 9 Although the Ministry was
highly centralized at first, it gradually vested some of its powers in other
agencies. The most significant of these were the State Committee for
Foreign Economic Relations, created in 1957, and the State Committee
for Science and Technology, created in 1965. In addition to the above
committees, the Ministry of Foreign Trade also cooperated with the Min-
istry of Finance (Minfin), the State Bank (Gosbank), the Bank for For-
eign Trade (Vneshtorgbank), the All-Union Chamber of Commerce
(operating the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission and the Maritime
Arbitration Commission) and the state agency for foreign insurance
(Ingosstrakh) °
The active responsibility for foreign trade transactions was
conferred by the Soviet State on the Foreign Trade Organizations
("FTOs").21 The Soviet State, owner of the means of production, allo-
Economic Orders, Particularly with Regard to Competition Rules, 10 INT'L Bus. LAW. 124 (1982);
Voznesenskaja 1985, supra note 9, at 64; Loeber, supra note 7, at 347.
15 J. QUIGLEY, supra note 1, at 62.
16 Loeber, supra note 7, at 346; Voznesenskaja 1985, supra note 9, at 64; J. QUIGLEY, supra
note 1, at 62.
17 Loeber, supra note 7, at 346; Voznesenskaja 1985, supra note 9, at 64.
18 W.E. BUTLER, supra note 1, at 333.
19 This is the Russian abbreviation of the words Gosudarstvennyi Plan. This is the State Plan-
ning Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers which previously had absolute control over both
foreign and domestic trade and over the Soviet economy as a whole. Today, under perestroika, its
powers are greatly circumvented.
20 Dore, supra note 1, at 76-78. Ingosstrakh, Intourist and the USSR Bank for Foreign Trade
(Vneshtorgbank) were the only legal entities still organized as joint stock societies in 1983. Since the
1927 Law on Joint Stock Companies was repealed in 1962, as mentioned earlier, "their legal status
[was thereafter] governed by the [1961 Fundamental Principles of Civil Law], union republic civil
codes, and their respective charters." W.E. BUTLER, supra note 1, at 338-39.
21 Butler uses the terms "Organizations" or "Associations." W.E. BUTLER, supra note 1, at
336. Dore, Loeber and Quigley mainly prefer the term "Combines." Dore, supra note 1, at 83;
Loeber, supra note 7, at 353; J. QUIGLEY, supra note 1, at 103-20. Hertzfeld uses the term "Corpo-
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cates state property to the FTOs for their operational needs. The FTOs
operate on the basis of their charters and accounts, under the Khozras-
chet system of independent economic accountability, and primarily
under the guidance and supervision of the Ministry of Foreign Trade or
any other competent ministry or state committee, depending on their
field of commercial activity.22 This foreign trade mechanism was in
place in the USSR when Mikhail S. Gorbachev became General Secre-
tary of the CPSU in 1985.
After the end of the Second World War, the new communist gov-
ernments of Czechoslovakia and Poland, as well as other Eastern Euro-
pean countries, generally followed the Soviet model in their efforts to
transform the countries, including the foreign trade sectors. When the
Communist Party, under the leadership of Klement Gottwald, came into
power in Czechoslovakia in 1948, it immediately nationalized the means
of production including those for the sector of foreign trade.
Czechoslovakia is a federal state, comprising the Czech Socialist Re-
public and the Slovak Socialist Republic. Consequently, a Federal
Ministry of Foreign Trade was created by Act 119/1948 on State Organi-
zation of Foreign Trade and International Forwarding.23 This Act regu-
lated all foreign trade activities until adoption of Act 42/1980 on
Economic Relations with Foreign Countries. The latter came into force
on July 1, 1980 and repealed the former with the exception of the provi-
sions concerning nationalization.24
The Czechoslovak Federal Ministry of Foreign Trade assumes pri-
mary responsibility for the foreign trade policy of the country. The Min-
istry determines the country's general trade policy according to
geographical areas of the world. Its operations are organized into three
departments, namely the Department of Socialist Countries, the Depart-
ment of Advanced Capitalist Countries and the Department of Develop-
ing Countries. The territorial pattern of Czechoslovak foreign trade
is largely comprised of Comecon countries (78%), as compared with
lower levels of activity with Western countries (16%) and Third World
rations." ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOVIET LAW, supra note 14, at 325. All of the terms interpret the
Russian word "objedinenija." J. QUIGLEY, supra note 1, at 109.
22 For instance, Soveksportfllm, which is responsible for the import and export of films, oper-
ates under the supervision of the Ministry of Culture. Intourist, which organizes the tourist activi-
ties of the country, operates under the guidance of the State Committee for Tourism.
Vneshtekhnika, which deals with technology exchanges and coordination, is under the direction of
the State Committee for Science and Technology. Ingosstrakh operates under the insurance division
of the Ministry of Finance. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOVIET LAW, supra note 14, at 325; J. QUIGLEY,
supra note 1, at 109-20.
23 Klein, Czechoslovakia, 8 INT'L Bus. SERIES 59 (1986).
24 Id. See also CZECHOSLOVAK CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY, CZECHOSLOVAK
ACT ON ECONOMIC RELATIONS wrH FOREIGN COUNTRIES 5 (1982).
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countries (6%).25 Two other organs of foreign trade are the Czechoslo-
vak Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the affiliated Arbitration
Court.2 6
The same route was followed in Poland by the Polish United Work-
ers' Party under the Presidency of Boleslaw Bierut.27 It is interesting to
note that by special provision of article VI of the Law on Introductory
Provisions of the Polish Civil Code of April 23, 1964, certain provisions
of the repealed Commercial Code of June 27, 1934, adopted by the pre-
war Republic of Poland, with respect to international trade transactions
were retained.28
In addition, the new communist regimes of Czechoslovakia and Po-
land did not forbid the existence of joint stock corporations within the
sector of foreign trade in the early period. Both countries followed the
Soviet model in force during the 1920s, as described above. As noted by
John Quigley, the countries estimated that the model "provide[d] an ef-
fective channel for industry participation in foreign trade decisions."' 29 It
was only later that the foreign trade export-import combines were set up.
In Poland, however, a few joint stock companies have remained. In
Czechoslovakia, they were reinstated in the middle of the 1960s because
their legal structure proved to be effective and flexible.3"
B. Transition from a State-to-State Bilateral Approach to a General
Joint Venture Legal Framework: The Effect of Perestroika
In Eastern Europe, the establishment of joint ventures was envis-
aged in the middle of the 1960s. The pioneer was Yugoslavia in 1967,
with Romania following in 1971, Hungary in 1972, Poland in 1976, Bul-
garia in 1980, Czechoslovakia in 1985 and the Soviet Union in 1987.3'
Joint ventures were considered necessary because the industrial co-
operation agreements were no longer sufficient, since they could not
cover the expanded fields of activity. A more complex cooperation
framework was necessary in order to undertake joint production and
25 A. Bruzek, The Czechoslovak Economy and the New Economic Mechanism (unpublished
speech available from the Prague School of Economics and in author's files).
26 Klein, supra note 23, at 80.
27 This is the official title of the ruling party in Poland. Its creation was the outcome of a
merger which took place in December 1948 between the Polish Worker's Party (Communist Party)
and the Socialist Party, both parties of the pre-war Republic of Poland.
28 Rajski & Wisniewski, Poland, 8 INT'L Bus. SERIES 205 (1986).
29 J. QUIGLEY, supra note 1, at 186, 197.
30 Id.
31 See generally C. H. MCMILLAN & D. P. ST. CHARLES, JOINT VENTURES IN EASTERN
EUROPE: A THREE COUNTRY COMPARISON (1974) (on early joint ventures of the modem era and
conditions for joint ventures in Romania, Yugoslavia and Hungary); see also Buzescu, Joint Ventures
in Eastern Europe, 32 AM. J. OF COMP. L. 407 (1984); Scriven, Co-operation in East-West Trade: The
Equity Joint Venture, 10 INT'L Bus. LAW. 105, 106-9 (1982).
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marketing, and to share risks and profits. In addition, this new frame-
work gave the Western investors an opportunity to expand their activities
into almost virgin markets, such as those of the CMEA member-coun-
tries.32 At the same time, it gave the host countries needed advanced
technology, managing skills and expertise. For the reasons stated above,
a great number of the established joint ventures were continuations and
expansions of existing cooperation agreements.33
In 1976, Poland was the first of the three countries to enact modern
foreign direct investment legislation. This was done through a cautious
general framework of regulations. The framework was rather blurred
and it consisted of the following: 1) Regulation No. 63/February 6, 1976
of the Council of Ministers "Concerning Conditions, Procedure and Or-
gans Competent to Grant Foreign Legal and Natural Persons Authoriza-
tions to Create Offices in Poland for Purpose of Carrying on Economic
Activity," which came as a result of the substantial export business un-
dertaken by foreign firms with Poland;34 2) Decree No. 123/May 14,
1976 of the Council of Ministers, which permitted wholly foreign-owned
businesses in Poland, but contained no provision at all on joint ventures;
and 3) Order Nos. 109 and 110 of the Minister of Finance/May 26, 1976
"Concerning Permits for Foreign Exchange Operations by Mixed Com-
panies," which dealt not only with the financial aspect of mixed capital
joint ventures but included regulation of their establishment, operation
and dissolution.35
The field of activities permitted under these three legislative acts was
rather restrictive and narrow. It was limited mostly to small handicraft;
small scale domestic trade; and hotel, catering and other services; in sum,
32 CMEA stands for Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, widely known as Comecon. It
was founded on January 20, 1949 in order to promote and coordinate the mutual exchange of eco-
nomic experience, technology, and raw materials between its members. Member states today are the
Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, the German Democratic Republic,
North Korea, Cuba, Vietnam and Mongolia.
33 This point of view is supported with respect to Soviet joint ventures by the highly reliable
weekly report Business Eastern Europe. More precisely, it is mentioned that "the majority of those
JVs registered to date are very small or are based on existing cooperation agreements. EKE-Sadolin
(Finland), Liyan (Liebherr/Switzerland), Igirima-Tairiky (Japan) and Est-Finn (Finland) were all
set up on the basis of existing cooperation agreements." Soviet Joint Ventures: The Problems Thus
Far, XVII Business Eastern Europe (Business International S.A.) No. 11, at 81-82 (Mar. 14, 1988).
On the functioning of industrial cooperation agreements, see an early discussion in Pedersen, Joint
Ventures in the Soviet Union: A Legal and Economic Perspective, 16 HARV. INT'L L.J. 390, 391
(1975).
34 Rajski & Wisniewski, supra note 28, at 207; Scriven, Joint Ventures in Poland: A Socialist
Approach to Foreign Investment Legislation, 14 J. WORLD TRADE L. 424, 426 (1980); Rajski, Legal
Aspects of Foreign Investment in Poland, YEARBOOK ON SOCIALIST LEGAL SYsTEMs 159-60 (W.
Butler ed. 1986) [hereinafter Rajski in YEARBOOK].
35 Scriven, supra note 34, at 426.
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to small scale production sectors of the company.36 As John G. Scriven
correctly remarked:
Although foreign legal persons were also permitted to make such
investment, the thrust of the legislation was to attract individuals. The
requirement of a Polish resident as proxy for the foreign investor, the
provisions relating to inheritance of the assets invested and the use of
the Polish Savings Bank (Bank Polska Kasa Opieki S.A.) rather than
the Polish Foreign Trade Bank (Bank Handlowy) demonstrate this
intention.
37
Moreover, although the above enactments gave the joint venture possibil-
ity a passing mention, joint ventures remained inoperative, since no
working regulations were implemented to make them active. 38 This was
due to theoretical controversies over the issue of whether foreign invest-
ment as such should be allowed. The view of the opponents on enhanced
status of Western foreign investment prevailed at the time, enabling the
Polish State to keep these new forms of activity out of the socialized
sectors of the economy. This model made policing trade easier, because
should it become necessary to eliminate market economy forces, elimina-
tion of small individual owners would be simpler than elimination of a
branch of a multinational company.39
The main goal of these legal enactments was to attract Polonian4°
private direct investment. Poland was the first socialist country to make
explicit recourse to its expatriates living abroad, principally in the United
States, Canada and countries of the European Community, in order to
36 Id. at 429.
37 Id. at 426-27.
38 M. Arnoldi, Western Investment in Poland (1976-1986) 28 (Nov. 11, 1987) (unpublished
thesis, available in Carleton University Library, Ottawa, Canada).
39 It should be added at this point that domestic trade as well had been recently regulated by
the Act of July 18, 1974 "Concerning Carrying on of Commerce and Some Other Kinds of Eco-
nomic Activity by Units of Non-Socialized Economy." Rajski & Wisniewski, supra note 28, at 207.
"This notion [of units of non-socialized economy] usually covers private national small industry and
trade as well as foreign nationals and foreign legal persons." Id. The existence of an important
private, non-socialized sector of the economy is a significant characteristic of post-war Poland; it is
explicitly stated that "individual family farms ... dominate agriculture." National Economy, in
POLAND 1988: GUIDEBOOK 76-77 (1988); Fontaine, Une question d Gorbachev et d quelques autres,
Le Monde, July 10, 1987, at 1.
40 The term Polonian is interpreted by the Polish authorities as comprising "individuals of
Polish origin who have maintained more or less their links to the Polish nation and culture... [and
who have maintained] traditions rooted in their Polish origin reveal[ing] interest in Polish culture
and show[ing] an understanding for the Polish national interests." Arnoldi, supra note 38, at 28. It
is estimated that ten to eighteen million Poles live in countries outside Poland. Famous Poles in-
clude Zbignew Brzezinski, National Security Advisor of U.S. President Carter and Michel
Poniatowski, Minister of Internal Affairs of France during the seven-year Presidency of Val6ry Gis-
card d'Estaing (1974-1981).
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seek investment capital.41
In 1979, three years later, a second attempt to attract foreign invest-
ment was introduced in the form of Resolution No. 24/February 7, 1979
of the Council of Ministers "On Establishing Business Enterprises with
Foreign Capital Participation in Poland and their Operation." This reg-
ulation of foreign direct investment was primarily concerned with the
definition of the legal framework for operating joint ventures. Unfortu-
nately, it appeared to be much more complicated, detailed and restrictive
than the previous regulation.42
The most problematic provisions of the combined 1976 and 1979
regulations were the limited life of the joint venture-up to fifteen years
in total-and the complicated scheme of profit repatriation, both of
which constituted stumbling blocks to foreign investment. "Even a Po-
lish foreign trade official admitted that the old regulations... 'contained
more injunctions and restrictions than they did incentives., "
Because of these difficulties, "[t]he Law of July 6, 1982 On Princi-
ples of Conducting an Economic Activity in Small Industry by Foreign
Corporate Bodies and Natural Persons in the Territory of the Polish Peo-
ple's Republic"" was enacted. The Law has a narrow scope. In particu-
lar, it is concerned with the increase of production and services for the
domestic market and for export. In principle, it is aimed at attracting
capital investment from Polonians, but in practice, it also attracts capital
from other foreigners.4" The Law sets no limit on the degree of foreign
capital participation. Consequently, enterprises undertaken under its
41 "In 1972 the Polish government formed the 'Polonia' Society," and later the Polish-Polonian
Chamber of Industry and Commerce, in order "to strengthen the cultural and commercial links of
6migr~s to the 'old country.'" See Arnoldi, supra note 38, at 29. It was estimated that their emo-
tional attitude, arising out of common culture, language and religion, would render them sympa-
thetic and adaptable to the peculiarities of Poland. This was proved earlier when expatriates helped
Poland and Czechoslovakia in 1947. Both of those countries had rejected any form of American
economic assistance under the Marshall Plan, as advised by Stalin, shortly before the creation of
Comecon. See Tagliabue, Poland Rejects Notion of Another "Marshall Plan", N.Y. Times, May 24,
1988, at All, col. 1. Furthermore, Polish investors would help their country and "would be less
likely to exploit members of their own nationality or criticize state policies." Arnoldi, supra note 38,
at 29-30, 51. This appears to be the main reason why at a later stage the Law of July 6, 1982 was
adopted.
42 Rajski in YEARBOOK, supra note 34, at 160.
43 Poland Eases JV Law, Invites Foreign Investment, XI Business Eastern Europe (Business
International S.A.) No. 24, at 197 (June 18, 1982).
44 See the text of the Law as amended in 1983 and 1985: The Law of July 6, 1982 on principles
of conducting an economic activity in small industry by foreign corporate bodies and natural persons in
the territory of the Polish People's Republic, INTER-POLCOM (Polish Information Magazine), No.
4/39, at 15 [hereinafter 1982 Law].
45 The Law creates the Polish-Polonian Chamber of Industry and Commerce to promote
Polonian investment. See 1982 Law, supra note 44, art. 5, paras. I and 2; see also supra note 41;
Buzescu, supra note 31, at 422.
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provisions can be wholly foreign-owned. 46 The Law was amended in
1983 and 1985, and is still in force.
Finally, on April 23, 1986 the Law "On Companies with Foreign
Capital Participation" was adopted.47 This Law's scope covers every as-
pect of investment, except those covered by the 1982 Law. In other
words, it covers large-scale industry and services, and is export-oriented.
Thus, Poland is a country which has two parallel legal frameworks
with respect to international joint ventures, depending on the level and
field of activity.48 The following sections of this Article study and com-
pare specific aspects of both frameworks.
A general process of decentralization and reduction of the size of the
central administration is continuing in Poland, in response to the senti-
ment that too many ministries existed. Officially, the number of minis-
ters, deputy ministers, secretaries and deputy secretaries of state was
stated to be 194 in October 1987.' 9 Consequently, a number of ministries
had to be abolished or restructured so that the size of the central admin-
istration would be reduced and become more flexible. As a result of this
reform, which took place at the end of 1987, the Ministry of Foreign
Trade was abolished and the new Ministry of Foreign Economic Cooper-
ation was created under Wladyslaw Gwiazda, effective as of January 1,
1988. The new Ministry was assigned the task of promoting joint
ventures.50
In Czechoslovakia, joint ventures have never been formally banned
in the past. "[T]here are actually a few foreign companies which have
survived since the pre-war years."' 51 Moreover, there is even a relevant
46 1982 Law, supra note 44, art. 1, para. 2.
47 A. BURZYNSKI, A FOREIGN INVESTOR'S GUIDE TO THE LAW OF APRIL 23, 1986 ON COM-
PANIES WITH FOREIGN CAPITAL PARTICIPATION 13 (1986), reprinted in ECONOMIC COMMISSION
FOR EUROPE, EAST-WEST JOINT VENTURES: ECONOMIC, BUSINESS, FINANCIAL AND LEGAL AS-
PECTS, at 162, U.N. Doc. ECE/Trade/162, U.N. Sales No. E.88.II.E.18 (1988) [hereinafter EAST-
WEST JOINT VENTURES]. A general comment on the Law is to be found in J. Rajski, La Nouvelle
Loi Polonaise sur les Socidtds d Participation Etrangdr, 2 REVUE DE DROIT DES AFFAIRES INTERNA-
TIONALES 217 (1987).
48 It was argued that the 1982 Law is not a true international joint venture law, since its target,
in principle, is Polonians. EASr-WEST JOINT VENTURES, supra note 47, at 25-26. Yet, the scope of
this Law allows a wider acceptance of foreign investors than the initial Polonian character of the
1976 regulations. See Arnoldi, supra note 38, at 50-51. Accordingly, a number of foreign non-
Polonian enterprises were permitted under the 1982 Law. For example, Arnoldi refers to the ex-
treme case of an enterprise named Ilori involving Polonians, a Soviet citizen and an Englishman. See
id. at 66.
49 Pologne: un nombre considerable de bureaucrates devraient dtre licenci6s, Le Monde, Oct. 9,
1987, at 8, col. 1.
50 W. Gwiazda, Lesjoint ventures dans lPeconomiepolonaise, LA POLOGNE CONTEMPORAINE 1
(1988). Wladyslaw Gwiazda holds the position of Minister of Foreign Economic Cooperation.
51 Fedorov, Joint Enterprises with Participation of Western Companies in Socialist Countries,
FOREIGN TRADE No. 2, at 15 (1987).
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provision for mixed enterprises in the Czechoslovak International Trade
Code of 1963.52 However, foreign partners were not given an opportu-
nity to utilize this mechanism and, consequently, this form of activity
was simply not used.
Bilateral industrial cooperation agreements prevailed until August
1985, when the "Principles Governing the Establishment of Joint Com-
panies Consisting of Czechoslovak Corporations and Companies from
Non-Socialist Countries" were enacted.53 The Principles are a collection
of provisions of individual rules of law dispersed in different Czechoslo-
vak acts and decrees. Thus the legal framework is insufficient, constitut-
ing the weakest form of legal regulation, since the governmental decision
enacting the Principles is not a generally binding legal instrument.
Moreover, the use of existing rules of law, which were not enacted with
the special purpose of enabling the creation of joint ventures is unsuita-
ble. The advantage of this legal framework, however, is that it leaves a
rather large margin in which the parties can negotiate and agree on the
basic founding documents, based on the specific character of the
venture.
54
The USSR started to envisage the enactment of legislation explicitly
permitting joint ventures with capitalist countries rather late. Before
implementation of the new legal framework, Ross B. Leckow accurately
remarked, "[T]he crucial precondition for the introduction of joint ven-
tures in the U.S.S.R. [is] a change in the Soviet leadership's world view,
... which presently sees Western involvement as Western interference,
[and] foreign participation as foreign domination."55 Thus, major re-
forms were undertaken only after Mikhail S. Gorbachev became Secre-
tary General of the CPSU and started implementing perestroika.
Therefore, joint ventures should be understood as part of the general
concept of perestroika.
56
52 Act 101/1963 on Legal Relations in International Commercial Relations. See CZECHOSLO-
VAK CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY, JOINT VENTURES IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA 3, 19
(1987) [hereinafter 1985 Principles]. Articles 2 and 625 of the Code provide that native and foreign
persons can undertake to "unite their activity or assets to attain a certain economic purpose." See
Loeber, supra note 7, at 349.
53 1985 Principles, supra note 52, at 13-18.
54 Id. at 4-5; see also Address by Frantisek Fisera, Secretary General, Czechoslovak Chamber
of Commerce and Industry on Joint Ventures in Czechoslovakia (unpublished speech given at Cana-
dian conference).
55 R. B. Leckow, Doing Business with the Soviets: The Legal Structure of Canadian-Soviet
Trade 100 (1986) (unpublished LL.M. thesis on deposit at York University Library).
56 In his book, Mikhail S. Gorbachev stresses "the need for a radical reform of the economic
mechanism and for restructuring the entire system of economic management." Furthermore, he
insists that "[tihe task now in hand is to bring the new machinery of economic management into full
operation competently and without delay." M. GORBACHEV, PERESTROIKA: NEW THINKING FOR
OUR COUNTRY AND THE WORLD 83, 88 (1987). In fact, Gorbachev, who had been Andropov's
protege, in reality continued and enhanced what Andropov himself had started by commissioning
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As a result of the gradual loosening of administrative control and
the implementation of decentralization of the economy, the first meas-
ures concerning joint ventures were adopted in 1986. They consisted of
two Resolutions of the CPSU Central Committee and of the Council of
Ministers of the USSR "On Measures to Improve the Management of
Foreign Economic Relations" and "On Measures to Improve the Man-
agement of Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation with Social-
ist Countries.""7 The two Resolutions contained two provisions of
utmost importance.
First, they created a new body at the ministerial level, the State For-
eign Economic Commission of the USSR Council of Ministers."8 This
new body assumed the supervision and coordination of the work of all
organizations involved in the sphere of foreign trade. Among them were
the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the State Committee for Foreign Eco-
nomic Relations, the State Committee for Foreign Tourism, the Bank for
Foreign Trade of the USSR and the State Customs Administration of the
USSR Council of Ministers.5 9 Second, the Resolutions contained guide-
lines for the creation of joint ventures with capitalist countries. Vladimir
M. Kamentsev, Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers,
was appointed Chairman of the new Commission. Ivan D. Ivanov, one
of the Deputy Chairmen of the Commission, is the Soviet trade official
identified as the architect of the new legal framework.'
Another important decentralizing change effected by the Resolu-
tions and implemented as of January 1, 1987 was the granting of foreign
trade rights to twenty-three ministries and eighty leading associations
and enterprises of the country." Although the total number of minis-
tries, associations and enterprises was 103 out of 45,000, it was a begin-
ning. Thus, the omnipotent monopoly of the Ministry of Foreign Trade
was largely circumvented in order to put Soviet enterprises in direct con-
several studies looking at possible economic reform. Andropov's attempts were left unfinished due
to his illness and subsequent death. Goldman & Goldman, supra note 9, at 559.
57 See the complete text of the two resolutions in FOREIGN TRADE No. 5, at 2-5, 5-9 (Eng. ed.
Supp. 1987). A Comment on the Resolutions is found in Dunn, The New Soviet Joint Venture Regu-
lations, 12 N. C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 172 (1987).
58 Two Years of Gorbachev: What's Ahead for Trade?, XVI Business Eastern Europe (Business
International S.A.) No. 20, at 153-54 (May 18, 1987).
59 See FOREIGN TRADE, supra note 57, and accompanying text.
60 Barringer, To Russia, for Partners and Profits, N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1988, § 3, at 1, col. 3,
and § 3, at 13, col. 1. Ivan D. Ivanov is not only the uncontested father of the 1986 Resolutions, but
the father of the three Decrees of January 13, 1987 as well. See also No Rush Into Russia, THE
ECONOMIST, Feb. 7, 1987, at 65.
61 V. KAMENTSEV, ECONOMIC TIES, A PREREQUISITE OF LASTING PEACE, 6 (1988). See also
Soviet Trade Reform: Change, With Confusion, XVI Business Eastern Europe (Business Interna-
tional S.A.) No. 8, at 57-58 (Feb. 23, 1987).
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tact with Western markets.62 These 1986 Resolutions and their guide-
lines regulating joint ventures served as a kind of "trial barometer" to
assess foreign businessmen's reactions in view of the decrees to come.63
Three new decrees were enacted on January 13, 1987, retroactive as
of January 1, 1987. The first was Decree No. 6362-XI of the Presidium
of the USSR Supreme Soviet "On Questions Concerning the Establish-
ment in the Territory of the U.S.S.R. and Operation of Joint Ventures,
International Amalgamations and Organizations with the Participation
of Soviet and Foreign Organizations, Firms and Management Bodies"
("Decree No. 6362").14
This Decree regulates a number of general issues, such as lease of
land, taxation and settlement of disputes. These issues are regulated by
the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet due to their constitutional
character. The second enactment was Decree No. 48 of the USSR Coun-
cil of Ministers "On the Establishment of the Territory of the U.S.S.R.
and Operation of Joint Ventures, International Amalgamations and Or-
ganizations of the U.S.S.R. and other CMEA Member-Countries" ("De-
cree No. 48").65 And the third was Decree No. 49 of the USSR Council
of Ministers "On the Establishment in the Territory of the U.S.S.R. and
62 Soviet Decentralization Makes More Work for Firms, XVI Business Eastern Europe (Busi-
ness International S.A.) No. 40, at 315 (Oct. 5, 1987). At this point it ought to be added that besides
the organizations having direct foreign trade rights, a much larger number of them has hard cur-
rency retention rights, although they still operate through FTOs. This constitutes a factor of pri-
mordial interest for Western businessmen. See Soviet Trade Reforms: Who Holds the Hard
Currency?, XVI Business Eastern Europe (Business International S.A.) No. 14, at 108 (Apr. 6,
1987).
63 Carpenter & Smith, US.-Soviet Joint Ventures: A New Opening in the East, 43 Bus. LAW.
79, 80 (1987).
64 Ved. Verkh. Soy. RSFSR, 1987, No. 2, art. 35, reprinted in Decree of the Presidium of the
USSR Supreme Soviet: On Questions Concerning the Establishment in the Territory of the USSR and
Operation of Joint Ventures, International Amalgamations and Organizations with the Participation of
Soviet and Foreign Organizations, FOREIGN TRADE No. 5, at 10 (Supp. Jan. 13, 1987) [hereinafter
Decree No. 6362-XI], and in EAST-WEST JOINT VENTURES, supra note 47, at 182, and in UNITED
NATIONS CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, JOINT VENTURES As A FORM OF INTER-
NATIONAL EONOMIC COOPERATION, Background Documents of the High-Level Seminar Organized
by the United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations in Co-Operation with the State Foreign
Economic Commission, and State Commission on Science and Technology of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, Moscow, 10 March 1988, at 145, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/93, U.N. Sales No.
E.88.II.A.12 (1988) [hereinafter JOINT VENTURES AS A FORM OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC Co-
OPERATION]. See also V Presidiume Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, Ekonomicheskaja Gazeta, Feb.
1987, No. 6, at 15.
65 SP SSSR, 1987, No. 8, at 38, reprinted in Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers: On the
Establishment in the Territory of the USSR and Operation of Joint Ventures, International Amalga-
mations and Organizations of the USSR and other CMEA Member-Countries, FOREIGN TRADE No.
5, at 10-15 (Eng. ed. Supp. Jan. 13, 1987) [hereinafter Decree No. 48]. The original Russian text of
the Decree was published in Ekonomicheskaja Gazeta. VSovete Ministrov SSSR, Ekonomicheskaja
Gazeta, Feb. 1987, No. 6, at 15-18 (official version of the 1986 Resolutions).
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Operation of Joint Ventures with the Participation of Soviet Organiza-
tions and Firms from Capitalist and Developing Countries" ("Decree
No. 49").66 Thus, the USSR became the first socialist country to opt for
separate legal frameworks with respect to joint ventures, depending on
the country involved. The subsequent sections of this Article compare
the different approaches of the two Decrees as part of an analysis of spe-
cific points of joint ventures legislation in the three countries under
examination.
It should be mentioned at this point that joint ventures with other
CMEA member-countries had been operating since May 26, 1983.67
That appears to be a reason for differentiating the legal frameworks in
1987. It should also be recalled that a number of specific measures and
procedures have been already undertaken by CMEA member-countries,
aiming at an intra-Comecon integration. The joint ventures in question
are regulated and financed by special Comecon institutions, such as the
International Bank for Economic Cooperation and the International In-
vestment Bank.68 Integration within Comecon itself is undertaken under
the guidelines of the 15-year "Comprehensive Program of the CMEA
Member-Countries' Specific and Technological Progress up to the year
2000," which was adopted in 1985.69
66 SP SSSR, 1987, No. 9, at 40, reprinted in Decree of the USSR Council of Minister" On the
Establishment in the Territory of the USSR and Operation of Joint Ventures with the Participation of
Soviet Organizations and Firms from Capitalist and Developing Countries, FOREIGN TRADE No. 5, at
16-19 (Eng. ed. Supp. Jan. 13, 1987) [hereinafter Decree No. 49], and in EAsT-WEST JOINT VEN-
TURES, supra note 47, at 183, and in JOINT VENTURES As A FORM OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
CO-OPERATION, supra note 64, at 146. The original Russian text of the Decree was published in
Pravda. V Sovete Ministrov SSSR: 0 poriadke sozdanqia na territorif SSSR i deiateinosti sovnestnykh
predpriatij s uchastiem sovetskikh orgnizatsj i firm kapitalisticheskikh i razvivajushchikhsja stran,
Pravda, Jan. 27, 1987, at 2. See also VSovete Ministrov SSSR, Ekonomicheskaja Gazeta, Feb. 1987,
No. 6, at 17-18 (official text of Decree No. 49 of Jan. 13, 1987).
67 Decree No. 48, supra note 65, paras. 3, 65. Paragraph 65 of Decree No. 48 annuls pre-
existing Decree No. 464 of May 26, 1983 of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers "On the Revision
Procedure for Proposals Regarding the Establishment of Joint Economic Ventures of the U.S.S.R.
and other CMEA Member-Countries in the Territory of the U.S.S.R." Paragraph 3 of Decree No.
48 maintains in power the Decree of May 26, 1983 of the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet
"On the Operation in the Territory of the U.S.S.R. of Joint Economic Organizations of the U.S.S.R.
and other CMEA Member-Countries" on a level parallel to the new Decree.
68 On cooperation inside Comecon, see Sychev, CMEA: Radical Changes to the Cooperation
Mechanism, FOREIGN TRADE No. 2, at 2, 4 (Eng. ed. 1988); Kozhin & Kuvshinov, Foreign Trade
Aspects of Direct Ties Between Organizations of the CMEA Countries, in FOREIGN TRADE No. 6, at
2-4 (1988); Durnev, CMEA Countries'Joint Ventures, FOREIGN TRADE No. 6, at 11-15 (Eng. ed.
1987); Comecon Bank Will Support Major Investment Projects, XVII Business Eastern Europe (Busi-
ness International S.A.) No. 22, at 171-72 (May 30, 1988).
69 On the 15-year "Comprehensive Programme of the CMEA Member-Countries' Scientific
and Technological Progress up to the Year 2000" and its implementation, see Sychev, supra note 68,
at 2; Kozhin & Kuvshinov, supra note 68, at 2; Durnev, supra note 68, at 11. See also Comecon
Cooperation: So What Else Is New?, XV Business Eastern Europe (Business International S.A.) No.
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The Decrees were given wide but insufficient publicity in the West.
One of the first persons to translate them was William E. Butler. How-
ever, Butler translated only two of the three Decrees, Decree No. 6362
and Decree No. 49.70 In his introductory note71 he does not refer to
Decree No. 48 nor does he deal with it. Furthermore, in his translations,
he uses terminology which is completely different from that of the offi-
cial Soviet translations.
For instance, Butler uses the term "joint enterprise" instead of
"joint venture," which is widely used in the West. He considers the term
"joint venture" to be inaccurate. That is partly true. The literal transla-
tion of the original Russian term "sovmestnoe predpriiatie" is "joint en-
terprise" in English. However, it is believed that the term "joint
venture" is accurately used in the official Soviet translation for the fol-
lowing two reasons. First, "venture" comes from a translation of the
term "riskovannoepredprigatie." In this case, the adjective "riskovannoe"
("risky") should be understood as implied, for joint ventures are enter-
prises where the notions of sharing both risk and capital are predominant
for all parties involved. Second, the English term "joint venture" is even
widely used in Russian in unchanged form: "dzhoint venchur.' '72
In support of this view it is noteworthy that the United Nations
Economic Commission for Europe in its recent book, East-West Joint
Ventures: Economic, Business, Financial and Legal Aspects, which was
published in April 1988, uses the official Soviet translation and not the
one published in International Legal Materials. 73 For these reasons, the
official Soviet translations will be used when referring to specific points of
the Decrees in the remaining sections of this Article.
After the initial operating period of the first joint ventures, a number
of problems occurred in practice, which will be addressed in subsequent
48, at 378 (Dec. 1, 1986); Soviets Set Up Institutes to Coordinate EE Research, XV Business Eastern
Europe (Business International S.A.) No. 39, at 308 (Sept. 29, 1986).
70 See William E. Butler's Translation of Decree No. 49 in Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
Decree on Joint Enterprises with Western and Developing Countries (Decree No. 49), 26 I.L.M. 749
(1987) [hereinafter Decree on Joint Enterprises]; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Edict Concerning
Taxation of Joint Enterprises in the Soviet Union and Dispute Settlement (Decree No. 6362), 26
I.L.M. 759 (1987). Because of this translation, most of the American literature on Soviet joint ven-
tures up to now has been studying only Decree No. 6362 and Decree No. 49, and not Decree No. 48.
See, e g., Carpenter & Smith, supra note 63; Ross, Foreign Investment: New Soviet Joint Venture Law,
28 HARV. INT'L L. J. 473 (1987); Cohen, A China-Watcher's Impressions of the Soviet Joint Enter-
prise Legislation, in LAW AFTER REVOLUTION 163, 167 (Butler, Maggs, & Quigley eds. 1988) and
Mendes, The Soviet Union: Open for Business? 1 REv. OF INT'L Bus. L. 357. Cohen and Mendes
even use the term "joint enterprise" preferred by Butler.
71 Decree on Joint Enterprises, supra note 70, at 749.
72 See, eg., Voznesenskaja 1985, supra note 9, at 61, 63 and 65.
73 EAsT-WE.sT JOINT VENTURES, supra note 47, at 182-83, 188. It should be mentioned that,
although the E.C.E.'s study examines Decree No. 48 and compares it with Decree No. 49, it does not
include the text. Id. at 15.
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sections. The Soviets reacted flexibly and in favor of adequate modifica-
tions.7 4 Consequently, on September 17, 1987, a first step was made: the
new Decree No. 1074 was adopted by the CPSU Central Committee and
the USSR Council of Ministers "On Additional Measures to Improve the
Country's External Economic Activity in the New Conditions of Eco-
nomic Management" ("Decree No. 1074").11
During a recent stage, another step towards reducing bureaucracy
took place. Both the Ministry of Foreign Trade and the State Committee
for Foreign Economic Relations were abolished. In their place the new
All-Union Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations was created in Janu-
ary 1988.76 Konstantin F. Katushev, previously head of the State Com-
mittee for Foreign Economic Relations, was appointed as the new
Minister.77  This restructuring was considered necessary because, as it
was remarked, "the second wave of perestroika leaves no room for inter-
mediate organizations and multiple layers of administration. The two-
level' system now favored by the top Soviet leadership aims to make min-
istries and their enterprises directly responsible for their own results."'7 8
The general legal framework of foreign trade and joint ventures has
evolved in this manner from the October Revolution until today in the
three countries under study in the present Article. This Article next ex-
74 Ivan D. Ivanov, Deputy Chairman of the State Foreign Economic Commission and architect
of the new legislation, when addressing Western businessmen in early September 1987, welcomed
their constructive criticism and comments. He recognized that problems do exist and assured that
every suggestion or opinion is carefully examined. Soviets Move to Counter Trade Reform Disrup-
tions, XVI Business Eastern Europe (Business International S.A.) No. 37, at 291 (Sept. 14, 1987).
75 Decree No. 1074 of the USSR Council of Ministers: On Additional Measures to Improve the
Country's External Economic Activity in the New Conditions of Economic Management, reprinted in
UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE, EAsT-WEST JOINT VENTURES ECO-
NOMIC, BUSINESS, FINANCIAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS 189 (1988) [hereinafter Decree No. 1074].
More extended excerpts of the Decree relevant to the establishing and operation of joint ventures
were published in JOINT VENTURES AS A FORM OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION,
supra note 64, at 173. The original Russian text was published in Ekonomicheskaja Gazeta. V
Tsentrainom Komitete KBSS i Sovete Ministrov SSSR, Ekonomicheskaja Gazeta, Oct. 1987, No. 41,
at 18-19. The official English translation of the entire Decree was published in FOREIGN TRADE.
On Additional Measures to Improve the Country's External Economic Activity in the New Conditions
of Economic Management. Decision of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Minis-
ters, FOREIGN TRADE No. 12, at 2-6 (Eng. ed. Sept. 17, 1987). For the official announcement of the
Decree, see V Politburo TS.K KBSS, Pravda, Sept. 18, 1987, at I and V Politburo TS.K. KBSS,
Izvestija, Sept. 19, 1987, at 1. For a detailed Western comment of the Decree, see Soviets Introduce
Broad Changes to JV Regulations, XVI Business Eastern Europe (Business International S.A.) No.
42, at 331 (Oct. 19, 1987).
76 V Presidiume Verkhovnogo Sovete SSSR, Izvestija, Jan. 17, 1988, at 1 (official
announcement).
77 Id.
78 Official: Soviets Drop Foreign Trade Ministry, XVII Business Eastern Europe (Business In-
ternational S.A.) No. 4, at 27 (Jan. 25, 1988); see also Soviet Trade Reform: More Disruptions Ahead,
XVII Business Eastern Europe (Business International S.A.) No. 3, at 17-18 (Jan. 18, 1988).
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amines specific approaches of current legislation regarding the creation,
operation and dissolution of joint ventures.
III. CREATION OF THE JOINT VENTURE
4. Fields of Activity: Undetermined, Limited or Restricted?
A threshold question relates to the fields in which joint ventures
may operate. In the three countries one may discern a general approach
regarding "barriers to access," which is rather pragmatic, liberal, and
based on economic factors.7 9
Soviet legislation is the most liberal of the three countries. More
specifically, Decree No. 49 does not define the activities which can be
carried out by East-West joint ventures on Soviet soil. Consequently,
proposals can be submitted in any field. However, the first paragraph of
Decree No. 49 mentions, as a prerequisite, the authorization required for
establishment, and it is obviously understood that the Soviet state
thereby can ultimately control the proposed fields of operation through
the device of withholding permission."
Decree No. 48 contains a slightly different provision. Its paragraph
2 contains a list of the fields of activity in which a CMEA joint venture
may be engaged. These include "production, scientific production, scien-
tific, technological and other economic activities in industry, science, ag-
riculture, construction, trade, transportation and other fields of the
national economy."81 This enumeration of common fields can be under-
stood as an incarnation of the intra-Comecon integration aimed at by its
Member-Countries, 2 which does not appear to be exclusive, but rather
indicative. The latter conclusion derives from the words "and other
fields of the national economy,"83 which confers discretion upon state
authorities to accept any proposal considered beneficial and fruitful for
all of the involved parties.
The Polish approach is more restrictive than the Soviet one. The
scope of application of the 1982 Law is evidently narrow, as may be seen
from its title. It concerns solely "small industry."
The Law does not define the term "small industry." Instead, it uses
an indirect approach.
79 Piontek, The Legal Regime of Foreign Direct Investment in Socialist Countries, in YEAR-
BOOK ON SOCIALIST LEGAL SYSTEMS 279, 329 (W. Butler ed. 1987).
80 Decree No. 49, supra note 66, para. 1.
81 Decree No. 48, supra note 65, para. 2.
82 See Sychev, supra note 68; Comecon Cooperation: So What Else is New?, XV Business East-
ern Europe (Business International S.A.) No. 48, at 377-78 (Dec. 1, 1986); Soviets Set Up Institutes to
Coordinate EE Research, XV Business Eastern Europe (Business International S.A.) No. 39, at 308
(Sept. 29, 1986).
83 Decree No. 48, supra note 65, para. 2.
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Under Article 6, [w]henever the Law mentions: 1) Polish eco-
nomic units, it means: a) small state industrial enterprises, b) social
organizations entitled to conduct an economic activity on the grounds
of other regulations, c) cooperatives, d) unions of producers and do-
mestic enterprises active in small industry, e) persons entitled to con-
duct handicraft or other economic activity on the grounds of other
regulations, [or] f) private persons undertaking economic activity
jointly with foreign economic units.8 4
Furthermore, under article 2 of the 1982 Law, "the economic activ-
ity in the sphere of small industry may consist [of]: 1) production of com-
modities or granting of services, 2) trade, or 3) export of own products or
services or import for own use in production or service activity."8 5 In
addition to this provision, E. Piontek adds, "[t]he production scale of
small industry may be considered, as may be employment. Of nearly 700
foreign enterprises operating in Poland under the (System of 1982), the
majority have 100 to 300 employees."8 6
The regulation of the 1986 Law is different. By virtue of article 41,
its application is prohibited with respect to those companies which would
normally be governed by the 1982 Law. 7 Therefore, its scope covers a
contrario "large industry" in general. However, a number of fields of
activity are explicitly excluded by this Law. No permit will be granted
for the activities of "defense, rail transport, air transport, communica-
tions, insurance, publishing (excluding the printing industry), and for-
eign trade agency."8 8  Still, the Minister of Foreign Economic
Cooperation 9 has the power in particularly justifiable cases, after agree-
ment with the Minister concerned, to deviate from this prohibition.90
Thus, the Polish approach remains open, but is more restrictive than the
approach of Soviet legislation.
The 1985 Czechoslovak Principles adopt the most restrictive ap-
proach using a different method. Instead of prohibiting certain fields, the
Principles determine the specific fields of permissible activity. Bohuslav
Klein points out
that originally the parties were allowed to establish common ventures
only in the field of industrial production. There were many who
84 1982 Law, supra note 44, art. 6.
85 Id. art. 2.
86 Piontek, supra note 79, at 289; Rajski, Le nouveau rdginejuridique des petits investissements
Jtrangers en Pologne, 2 REVUE DE DROIT DES AFFAIRES INTERNATIONALE 217, 218 (1985) [here-
inafter Rajski 1985].
87 A. BURZYNSKI, supra note 47, art. 41, at 26.
88 Id. art. 7, para. 1, at 15.
89 See generally id. The Law of April 23, 1986 in the Burzynski guide uses the term "Minister
of Foreign Trade," but henceforth in this article the name of the new Ministry as applicable since
January 1, 1988 will be used.
90 Id. art. 7, para. 2, at 15.
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thought this restriction unwarranted, feeling that particularly the
sphere of services (transport, touristic [sic] etc.) would need the same
promotion as industrial production. Our government took these views
into consideration and since February 1, 1987, allowed the Principles
to be applied also, in the sphere of tourism.
91
Taking into consideration the phrasing of chapter I, section 1 of the 1985
Principles - "only in the field of industrial production [of the Czechoslo-
vak national economy] and in the sphere of tourism" 92 - the conclusion
can be drawn that the Czechoslovak approach is without doubt the most
restrictive of the three countries with respect to permitted fields of activ-
ity of joint ventures.
B. Administrative Procedure for Authorization and Establishment
1. Issuing of Permits, Registration and Publications
After determining the fields of activity of joint ventures, the next
issue is the procedure which must be followed in order to establish the
joint venture as a distinct legal entity. The first step is the granting of an
official authorization by the competent authorities of the host country.
Subsequently, there must be registration of the formal existence of the
new legal entity under a specific administrative procedure.
Every socialist country requires both application for a permit and
registration in order to allow establishment of a joint venture. This is
due to the prevailing notion that the joint venture constitutes an excep-
tional entity within the framework of the state planned economy and the
state ownership of the means of production. Therefore, the State has the
last word in approving given forms of investment participation by a for-
eign legal or natural person.
Initially, the USSR Council of Ministers could approve or reject a
proposal at its discretion within the USSR. Now, by virtue of Decree
No. 1074, this task falls to the ministries and departments of the USSR
and the Councils of Ministers of the fifteen Union Republics.9 3 This
change came as a result of the decentralizing procedures gradually imple-
mented in the country.
Apparently, the local partner no longer has the obligation to obtain
the advice of the USSR State Planning Committee,94 the USSR Ministry
of Finance and other ministries and government agencies concerned. 95
91 1985 Principles, supra note 52, at 5.
92 Id. para. I, at 13.
93 See EAsr-Wasr JoINT VENTURES, supra note 47, at 189, Soviet Union Decree No. 1074.
94 For a discussion of the Gosplan, see supra note 19.
95 This opinion is maintained in Voznesenskaja, Sovmestnye predprijatia s uchastiem firm
kapitalisticheskikh i razvivajushchikhsa stran na territorif SSSR (Joint Ventures with the Participation
of Firms from Capitalist and Developing Countries in the Territory of the U.S.S.R.) SOVETSKOE
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However, it has been stated that "[o]bviously the granting of this right to
the above said governmental bodies does not relieve them of the need to
coordinate their actions with other governmental agencies and (or) apply
to the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers whenever this or that particular
question is within the latter's competence." '96
The procedure to be followed is practically the same under Decree
Nos. 48 and 49 with respect to joint ventures. More specifically, under
paragraph 4 of Decree No. 48 and paragraph 2 of Decree No. 49, the
Soviet party submits the application, accompanied by a feasibility study,
an establishment proposal and draft foundation documents.97
As soon as the foundation documents are signed, the joint venture
has to be registered with the Ministry of Finance. It is expressly stipu-
lated that the joint venture "acquire[s] the rights of a legal entity [only]
at the time of registration."98 This provision has created a number of
interpretation issues with respect to the legal status of the joint venture at
the time of signature of the final agreement and during the period be-
tween signature of the final agreement and registration with the Ministry
of Finance. It is true that Instruction No. 34 of February 12, 1987 of the
USSR Ministry of Finance, "On the Procedure for Registering Joint
Ventures, International Amalgamations and Organizations Set Up on
Soviet Territory with the Participation of Soviet and Foreign Organiza-
tions, Firms and Management Bodies," and the later-issued Regulation
of the USSR Ministry of Finance No. 224 of November 24, 1987, "Con-
cerning the Procedure of Registering Joint Ventures, International
Amalgamations and Organizations Established in the Territory of the
U.S.S.R. with the Participation of Soviet and Foreign Organizations,
Firms, and Authorities," in section I, paragraph 3, prohibit the joint ven-
ture from opening a bank account and/or undertaking any negotiations
or entering into any transactions or concluding any contracts with Soviet
organizations before its registration.99 The Instruction and the Regula-
tion confirm that the joint venture is not a legal entity before registration.
However, as Ninel N. Voznesenskaia has pointed out, the wording of
paragraph 9 of both Decree Nos. 48 and 49 appears confusing. How can
GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO (SOVIET STATE AND LAW) 117, 120 (Jan. 1988) [hereinafter Voznesenskaja
1988]. The obligation to obtain preliminary advice was a mandatory requirement under the initial
form of Decree Nos. 48 and 49. Decree No. 48, supra note 65, para. 4; Decree No. 49, supra note 66,
para. 2.
96 See Smirnov, Joint Ventures on Soviet Territory: First Agreements and the Development of
Legal Regulation, FOREIGN TRADE No. 1, at 45-46 (Eng. ed. 1988) [hereinafter Smirnov 1988].
97 Decree No. 48, supra note 65, para. 4; Decree No. 49, supra note 66, para. 2.
98 Decree No. 48, supra note 65, para. 9; Decree No. 49, supra note 66, para. 9.
99 Reference to Instruction No. 34 is made in Smirnov 1988, supra note 96, at 45; JOINT VEN-
TURES AS A FORM OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION, supra note 64, at 201;
Voznesenskaja 1988, supra note 95, at 125; Soviet Joint Ventures: Answers Coming Slowly, XVII
Business Eastern Europe (Business International S.A.) No. 41, at 321-22 (Oct. 12, 1987).
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there be discussion about "the foundation documents [of the joint ven-
ture] com[ing] into force and about joint ventures established in the terri-
tory of the U.S.S.R." after signing, on the one hand, and about the joint
venture "acquir[ing] the rights of a legal entity at the time of registra-
tion" on the other?" 0 It is obvious that future amendments should re-
form the obscure and somehow contradictory phrasing of the paragraphs
of the Soviet Decrees.
After registration, paragraphs 9 of Decree Nos. 48 and 49 require
publication of a relevant notification in the press. It has been reported
that this requirement creates confusion since the law does not define
where notifications are to be published. Consequently, although "the
first registration was carried in Izvestija, others got lost in small, local or
regional papers."' 0' This point should also be dealt with specifically in
future amendments.
The 1985 Czechoslovak Principles do not determine directly which
state body is responsible for granting a permit. However, they indirectly
provide that "Czechoslovak participants may not enter into a joint ven-
ture, unless a state permission by their central government body is
granted."102 Besides, "[s]uch authority must secure in advance an ap-
proval by the State Planning Commission, Federal Ministry of Finance,
Federal Ministry of Foreign Trade and Czechoslovak State Bank."' 1 3 It
is understood that the above procedure would more or less apply to the
foreign party, too. It is clear that a cautious legislative approach was
adopted by the 1985 Principles. The approval mechanism for the estab-
lishment of joint ventures requires coordination and approval by a large
number of state bodies. These bodies have to approve the creation docu-
ments of the common company. In this country, such documents are
called memoranda or articles of incorporation, depending on the legal
structure of the common company.'0 4
With regard to registration procedures, the 1985 Principles provide
that "[a] common organization will not become a legal entity until en-
tered into the Register of Commerce [Companies Register]."' 1 5 With
this brief and concise regulation no legal interpretation questions seem to
arise, as is the case under Soviet legislation. Any specific publication pro-
vision is missing from the Principles. It can be presumed that the Com-
100 Voznesenskaja 1988, supra note 95, at 125.
101 Soviet Joint Ventures: Answers Coming Slowly, supra note 99, at 321-22.
102 1985 Principles, supra note 52, para. 1.5.1, at 14.
103 Id.
104 Id. para. 1.4(d), at 13. It should be noted at this point that, in contrast to Soviet legislation,
the 1985 Czechoslovak Principles and the 1986 Polish Law provide for incorporation of the joint
venture.
105 Id. para. 1.5.2, at 14.
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panies Register is per se public and further official publication is deemed
useless.
The Polish legal framework regarding procedure to obtain a permit
differs under the 1982 Law from that prevailing under the 1986 Law.
Yet, in spite of their differences, both procedures are detailed and
complex.
First, under the 1982 Law an application for a permit to establish a
so-called foreign economic unit is to be submitted jointly by the part-
ners;1 06 conversely, the application for a permit to establish a company
with foreign capital participation under the 1986 Law is submitted by the
Polish partner.107 A possible reason for this differentiation could be the
more personal and limited scope of the 1982 Law in contrast to the 1986
Law, which regulates larger economic units.
Second, under the 1982 Law the competent authority to grant a per-
mit is the State local administrative authority at the voivodship (provin-
cial) level;10 8 conversely, under the 1986 Law the permit is granted at the
central level by the Minister of Foreign Economic Cooperation "acting
in agreement with the Minister of Finance and other authorities." 109 It
seems that this mechanism "strengthens the uniformity and stability of
[State] policy."11
Third, both laws specify what the application for a permit should
contain. The most important requirements are basically the same: pur-
pose of formation, kind and scope of economic activity, expected employ-
ment scale, value and proportion of capital invested and proposed
location of the seat of the enterprise in Poland.111 Other provisions stip-
ulate possible legal structures of the new economic unit. Under the 1982
Law the firm can be wholly foreign-owned by a foreign natural or juridi-
cal person, or it can be formed with the participation of Polish economic
units. 112 Conversely, under the 1986 Law the new company must be cre-
ated through a merger between Polish state enterprises and other social-
ized units on the domestic side, and foreign enterprises or natural
persons on the foreign side.113 Another difference is the requirement
under the 1982 Law that the foreign investor pay a founding deposit.
This deposit is a prerequisite for granting a permit and is released as soon
as the new unit is fully operational.114 It seems that this requirement was
106 1982 Law, supra note 44, art. 11.
107 A. BURZYNSKI, supra note 47, art. 5, para. 2, at 14.
108 1982 Law, supra note 44, art. 8, para. 2.
109 A. BURZYNSKI, supra note 47, art. 5, para. 2, at 14; Piontek, supra note 79, at 328.
110 A. BURZYNSKI, supra note 47, art. 5, para. 2, at 14.
111 1982 Law, supra note 44, art. 10; A. BURZYNSKI, supra note 47, art. 9, at 15.
112 1982 Law, supra note 44, art. 1.
113 A. BURZYNSKI, supra note 47, art. 3, at 13.
114 1982 Law, supra note 44, art. 16.
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imposed by the 1982 Law in order to safeguard Polish State interests,
because a number of foreign investors were interested in casual invest-
ment in Poland. The main purpose of these investors was to engage in
unlawful speculation and misrepresentation in order to obtain the highest
possible profit in a short period of time, and then disappear.115 This re-
quirement was felt unnecessary under the 1986 Law, since the required
feasibility study together with a certified document showing legal status
and financial standing fulfills the same goal.
1 16
Under the 1982 Law, as soon as the permit is granted, the enterprise
is obliged to register in the Register of Foreign Enterprises. Entry in the
Register is made by courts of law in accordance with regulations deter-
mined by the Minister of Justice.1 17 Under the 1986 Law the company is
subject to registration in a court of register according to the rules of the
Commercial Code on the Commercial Register. The permit is to be at-
tached to the application for registration. 18 In addition, within two
weeks, the management board of the company is obliged to notify the
Minister of Foreign Economic Cooperation, indicating the court in
which the company has been registered. 1 9
A comparison of the registration systems in the USSR, Czechoslo-
vakia and Poland, reveals that the procedure required by the two latter
countries involves courts of law and is similar to registration in civil law
jurisdictions, such as West Germany and France. It should be
remembered that in Poland, this is the applicable procedure still pro-
vided for by the Commercial Code of 1934. Conversely, in the USSR the
procedure is purely administrative. In the three countries the permit and
registration procedure fully satisfies the requirements of state
supervision.
Finally, only one Eastern European country, Poland, sets a definite
time limit for the final approval of the joint venture application. Under
both the 1982 and the 1986 Laws the appropriate decision must be issued
within three months from the day the application was submitted. 20 The
1982 Law mentions that this time period applies to complete applica-
tions. Such a provision should be understood as implied by the 1986
115 Arnoldi, supra note 38, at 33, 46 and 59.
116 A. BURZYNSKI, supra note 47, art. 9, para. 2, item 2, at 16. The certification of documents
showing legal status and financial standing is carried out in practice by the territorially appropriate
Office of the Commercial Counsellor of the Polish People's Republic. Piontek, supra note 79, at 311.
The required feasibility study is usually conducted by the local consulting organization Invest-ex-
port. Will Your Polish JV Work? Official Report Tells All, XVII Business Eastern Europe (Business
International S.A.) No. 1, at 3-4 (Jan. 4, 1988).
117 1982 Law, supra note 44, art. 20, paras. 1, 3.
118 A. BURZYNSKI, supra note 47, art. 12, at 17.
119 Id. art. 13, at 17.
120 1982 Law, supra note 44, art. 13; A. BURZYNSKI, supra note 47, art. 9, para. 4, at 16.
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Law also.1 2 ' It is believed that in every other country the decision would
be made within a reasonable amount of time, because any unjustified de-
lay would constitute a negative factor in welcoming foreign investment.
2. Appeal Against Refusal of the Host Countries to Grant a
Permit
When a potential foreign investor expresses interest in forming a
joint venture in a certain country, his motivation is to be understood as
either the will to continue under a new form and expand an already ex-
isting industrial cooperation agreement,'22 or as a favorable reaction to
expressed manifestations of interest to form a joint venture by state enter-
prises or other potential partners of that country. It is difficult to think
of a Western company, which intends to create a joint venture, starting
with no positive indications from the host country. Following this train
of thought, everything depends on the success of the undertaken negotia-
tions. If the agreed terms satisfy both parties, submission of an applica-
tion should be expected. If the negotiations do not satisfy the aims
envisaged by the parties, no application will be submitted. Therefore,
the need to file an appeal against a negative decision of the host country's
authorities seems very unlikely.
In the legislation of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, this issue
is not mentioned at all. Both Soviet Decree Nos. 48 and 49 are silent on
the matter. The same applies in the case of the Czechoslovak 1985 Prin-
ciples. Only the Polish laws contain a relevant provision.
More precisely, article 19 of the 1982 Law stipulates that decisions
concerning permits may constitute the object of an appeal before the ad-
ministrative court according to the Code of Administrative Procedure.
However, no appeal is permitted against decisions refusing to grant a
permit for reasons of state security or protection of state secrets. 23
While, to a party proposing a joint venture, the utility of the Polish ap-
peal provision is questionable, the Polish State has reportedly used the
provision on state security infringement in order to control casual invest-
ment and to discourage the founding of unfavorable enterprises. 2 4 To
the joint venturer, the appeal provision is probably null in practice.
On the contrary, article 6, paragraph 2 of the 1986 Law prohibits
any appeal, explicitly stating that "the refusal to grant a permit may not
be contested before an administrative court."' 125 Thus, the Minister of
121 See supra note 120.
122 Soviet Joint Ventures: The Problems Thus Far, XVII Business Eastern Europe (Business
International S.A.) No. 11, at 81 (Mar. 14, 1988); Pedersen, supra note 33, at 390.
123 1982 Law, supra note 44, art. 19.
124 Arnoldi, supra note 38, at 58.
125 A. BURZYNSKI, supra note 47, art. 6, para. 2, at 15.
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Foreign Economic Cooperation can make a final decision not to grant a
permit if he considers the economic activity to be undertaken inadvisa-
ble, based either on national economy interests or on state security.12
6
Predominance of state policy is therefore consolidated.
3. The Need for a Special Foreign Trade Permit
Every new joint venture faces the question of whether it will be in-
volved in foreign trade activities. In the past, legislation of socialist
states usually treated this factor very narrowly since the state always has
a monopoly on foreign trade.
This reality is the reason behind the Polish and Czechoslovak legal
framework dealing with this issue. Under the 1982 Law in Poland, the
mixed enterprise needs to acquire issuance of a special permit by the
Minister of Foreign Economic Cooperation - not the State local adminis-
trative authority at the voivodship (provincial) level, which is the compe-
tent agency for granting the general permit - in order to carry out foreign
trade operations. This derives from a combined interpretation of article
8, paragraph 6 and article 2, item 3.t17 Only exceptionally are Polonian
joint enterprises involved in foreign trade, since their main focus is do-
mestic trade and consumer goods. Nevertheless, a number of them be-
gan to get involved in foreign trade, especially after the new tax breaks
introduced by the 1985 Decree. 128
The approach undertaken by the 1986 Law is almost equivalent.
However, there is one major difference. The right to conduct foreign
trade is granted by the original permit establishing the joint company
rather than by a special permit, provided that such a request was filed
with the initial application. 129
In Czechoslovak legislation, there is a special provision on separate
foreign trade licenses. 130 Bohuslav Klein has remarked, "[t]he foreign
would-be investors believe generally, that upon being granted the author-
ization to establish a common company, they are automatically granted
the leave to engage in foreign trade. This is a mistake. The newly cre-
ated joint venture company will have to apply formally for such a
leave."1 31
The approach of the 1985 Principles differentiates depending on the
currency. If the joint venture is granted a foreign trade permit, it can
126 Id. art. 6, para. 1, at 15.
127 1982 Law, supra note 44, art. 8, para. 6 and art. 2, para. 3; Rajski 1985, supra note 86, at
220.
128 Arnoldi, supra note 38, at 60.
129 A. BURZYNSKI, supra note 47, art. 9, para. 1, item 8, at 16 and art. 10, para. 1, item 3, at
17.
130 1985 Principles, supra note 52, para. 1I.7, at 17.
131 Id. at 9.
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lead exports and imports automatically, in freely convertible currencies
regardless of the originating country. Consequently, should a convertible
currency transaction take place even with another Comecon country, the
joint company is automatically authorized to undertake this transaction
autonomously. Conversely, for foreign trade activities led in non-con-
vertible currencies, the use of a Czechoslovak FTO as a middleman is
mandatory. The deal will be carried out at prices agreed between the
joint venture and the FTO involved.13 z
The most modem approach on foreign trade operations is that pro-
vided by the Soviet joint venture legal framework. Decree No. 49, para-
graph 24 stipulates that "[a] joint venture is entitled to transact
independently in export and import operations necessary for its business
activities, including export and import operations in the markets of
CMEA member-countries."' 133
It is understood that no other permit is required. From its creation
the joint venture can automatically be involved in foreign trade activities
without restriction. It may also use the services of an FTO under con-
tractual arrangements. 134
The situation is quite different under Decree No. 48. Due to lack of
currency convertibility within Comecon, the joint venture is required to
settle accounts in transferable rubles 135 or in foreign currencies through
the USSR Bank for Foreign Economic Affairs 36 and the International
Bank for Economic Cooperation.' 37 Obviously, no special foreign trade
authorization is required in this case either.
C. Legal Structures
Legal structures under which a joint venture may be created are an
important issue for every country. The legislative approaches to this is-
sue by the three countries differ.
The modern Polish legislature used a convenient and tested way to
regulate the structure of joint ventures: the pre-war Polish legislation
132 Id. at 9-10.
133 Decree No. 49, supra note 66, para. 24.
134 Id.
135 The transferable ruble is a monetary accounting unit in use for commercial transactions
between the Soviet Union and other CMEA member-countries. See, e.g., Marrese, CMEA: Effective
but Cumbersome Political Economy 40 INT'L ORG. 287 (1986); Transferable Ruble - A Fiction, Sovi-
ets Admit, XVI Business Eastern Europe (Business International S.A.) No. 24, at 189 (June 15,
1987).
136 The USSR Bank for Foreign Economic Affairs (Vneshekonombank) is the new bank which
replaced the former Bank for Foreign Trade. On restructuring of the Soviet banking system, see
infra note 198 and relevant bibliographical references.
137 Decree No. 48, supra note 65, para. 21. The International Bank for Economic Cooperation
and the International Investment Bank are Comecon banks.
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which belonged to the broad family of civil law. The 1934 Commercial
Code recognized three forms of companies: 1) the limited liability com-
pany, which is similar to the West German Gesellschaft mit beschr'inkter
Haftung or the French Soci&t6 responsabilit6 limit~e; 2) the joint stock
company, which is similar to the German Aktiengesellschaft or the
French Soci6t6 anonyme; and 3) the general partnership.
The international commercial transaction provisions of the 1934
Commercial Code have been retained by the 1964 Polish Civil Code.' 38
Thus, when the 1982 law was enacted it was easy to refer to the 1934
Code and provide for use of any legal structure available at the parties'
selection.139 Of course the foreign investor may undertake activities as a
natural person as well. Obviously, no company structure whatsoever is
necessary in this case."4°
The 1986 Law is slightly different. First, only companies are al-
lowed to undertake activities under this law; incorporation is therefore
indispensable. Even the title of the Law reflects this emphasis: it regu-
lates "companies with foreign capital participation."
Second, article 2 of the Law provides that the joint venture may
only take the form of either a limited liability company or a joint stock
company. 141 Therefore, the general partnership, the third type of com-
pany provided by the 1934 Commercial Code, is excluded.
In Czechoslovakia, the 1985 Principles provide for two forms of
common companies: a company limited by shares - i.e., a form of incor-
porated company, and an association. 42 The limited company is regu-
lated by the Limited Companies Act of 1949, while the association is
governed by the respective provisions of the International Trade Code of
1963, namely articles 625 and following. 43 At last, the existing legal
framework for the establishment of joint venture provided by the Czech-
oslovak International Trade Code of 1963, which was mentioned earlier
in this Article,'" is thus being activated in practice by the 1985
Principles.
The Soviet case is entirely different in this context. There is no pro-
vision for joint ventures to acquire concrete legal forms of a kind similar
to those in force in Western or other socialist countries. The only specific
structural provision is to be found in paragraph 8 of Decree No. 48 and
paragraph 7 of Decree No. 49 regulating the contents of the joint venture
138 For more on this Polish legal mechanism, see Rajski & Wisniewski, supra note 28, at 205.
139 1982 Law, supra note 44, art. 21; Piontek, supra note 79, at 297.
140 1982 Law, supra note 44, art. 1.
141 A. BURZYNSKI, supra note 47, art. 2, para. 1, at 13.
142 1985 Principles, supra note 52, para. 1.3, at 6.
143 Id.
144 Id.
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statute. 14
5
It can be argued that the lengthy absence of joint venture legislation
resulted in a lack of experience in the field, since industrial cooperation
agreements were predominant. Moreover, it seems that the Decrees are
purposely vague in order to enable prospective partners to arrange their
mutual relations at will. Thus, detailed experience would be gained in
practice.
However, the legal status of Soviet joint ventures as it stands today
has been largely criticized. Its concrete problematic features have been
discussed. For instance, it has been pointed out that a joint venture re-
sembles a joint stock company without shares for its equity capital, only
participation certificates. Consequently, "there are no shareholders and
thus no annual general meeting."'146
In this context the New York Times recently reported:
Soviet lawyers and bankers stressed how far they had come in 18
months in establishing the ground work for joint ventures. But they
acknowledged that there were still no laws governing some crucial
questions, such as how the new ventures can be organized as independ-
ent companies rather than partnerships. Even the basic joint-venture
law has big loopholes. "You register with the Ministry of Finance and
you have a joint venture, but it is a kind of fiction," said Ninel N.
Vosnesenskaya, a leading Soviet expert on joint-venture law. "There is
no requirement that the ventures be capitalized," she said. 147
Another problematic feature is the different status created by Decree
No. 48 with respect to special types of common ventures which are possi-
ble only between CMEA member-countries. The special ventures are,
according to the Decree, international amalgamations and organizations.
They are legal entities under Soviet law 14 8 but do not possess common
property. 49 They are set up to coordinate cooperation, co-production
and joint economic activities in individual industries, technical develop-
ment, foreign trade or other economic fields. 5 ° Yet, separate treatment
of joint ventures by the two Decrees might easily cause difficulties for an
eventual tripartite common company between a Soviet enterprise, an en-
terprise from another socialist country and a western firm. 51
All reported legal vacuums and obscurities have led to a characteri-
zation of the actual legal framework as "uncertain" and "not providing
145 Decree No. 48, supra note 65, para. 8; Decree No. 49, supra note 66, para. 7.
146 Finns or Japanese? First Soviet JVSigned, XVI Business Eastern Europe (Business Interna-
tional S.A.) No. 26, at 201, 202 (June 29, 1987).
147 Feder, Soviet Joint Ventures Face Obstacles, N.Y. Times, June 20, 1988, at D5, col. 1.
148 See Decree No. 48, supra note 65, para. 7.
149 Id. paras. 2, 51.
150 Id.; see also Durnev, supra note 68, at 12.
151 Voznesenskaja 1988, supra note 95, at 120.
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sufficient guarantees."1 5 2 Thus, if the legal framework is not strength-
ened and specified, it will probably work as a disincentive in the long run.
IV. OWNERSHIP
A. Partners and Equity Share of the Ownership: Actual and
Anticipated Tendencies
As shown above, all Eastern European countries consider joint ven-
tures to be part of an exceptional legal framework which parallels that of
the nationalized economy. The state is the owner of the means of pro-
duction and exercises administrative supervision to every economic unit
which operates within its boundaries.
Usually the local partners are state enterprises or other legal entities
of the socialized sector of the economy. Their aim is to safeguard state
interests of the host country against possible foreign exploitation during
the course of their participation in the joint venture.
For this reason, a socialist country's equity participation is generally
required to be at least fifty-one percent or more. There are exceptions,
however. Recently, countries which have already acquired joint venture
experience, such as Hungary, have gradually allowed a foreign majority
equity share in specific sectors of the economy such as tourism, finance
and services. 53 This is still largely not the case in the USSR, Poland or
Czechoslovakia, although the Polish provisions are the most flexible of
the three.
Soviet Decree No. 49 explicitly stipulates that "[t]he share of the
Soviet side in the authorized fund of a joint venture shall be not less than
51 percent." ' 4 The Decree provides no exception whatsoever under any
circumstance. Conversely, the different legislative treatment reserved for
other CMEA member-countries is also stipulated in the same respect.
Decree No. 48 does not require a fifty-one percent Soviet majority. It
only states that the equity shares of the partners in a CMEA joint ven-
ture are to be defined by the foundation documents.1 5 Moreover, it pro-
vides that "[t]he property of a joint venture is the common socialist
property of the USSR and of the CMEA member-country concerned."15 6
It is evident that the above provisions are aimed at greater intra-
Comecon integration. This is expressly justified by the Preamble of De-
cree No. 48 where it is stated that the Decree was adopted "[flor the
purpose of intensification of the socialist economic integration, [and] con-
152 Soviet Joint Venture: The Problems Thus Far, XVII Business Eastern Europe (Business
International S.A.) No. 11, at 81, (Mar. 14, 1988).
153 A. BURZYNSKI, supra note 47, at 45.
154 Decree No. 49, supra note 66, para. 5.
155 Decree No. 48, supra note 65, para. 27.
156 Id. para. 25.
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solidation of the scientific, technological and industrial potentials of the
member-countries of the socialist community."' 157
The approach adopted by the Czechoslovak Principles corresponds
to the classic model of a fifty-one percent host state majority share.
Chapter I, section 4, item (a) of the Principles specifies that "a foreign
participant cannot hold a share of more than forty-nine (49) percent in
the corporate capital."' 58 Again, no exception whatsoever is made.
The most important departure from the fifty-one percent rule is to
be found in the Polish 1982 Law, which is unique in this respect. It al-
lows for 100 percent foreign equity capital in the field of small indus-
try.'59 This provision is noteworthy for an additional reason: when the
Law was adopted in the early 1980s, such a departure could be charac-
terized as provocative for a socialist country. Probably this departure
was due to the intention of Polish authorities to grant permits only to
Polonians. But this intention was superseded by the final granting of
permits even to the most odd combination of foreign partner origins."
The Law, nevertheless, provides for a Polish equity share exceeding fifty
percent in cases substantiated by economic or social reasons. 61 Yet, it
has been reported that this has never occurred in practice.162
The 1986 Law follows the rule as well. Article 8, paragraph 1 de-
clares that "the equity participation of Polish partners in company's cap-
ital shall be at least 51 . ' ' 163 However, paragraph 2 of the same article
stipulates an important diversion. The Minister of Foreign Economic
Cooperation is granted authority to depart from the rule of paragraph 1
provided that: 1) he acts in accordance with the Minister concerned;
2) the case is economically justified; and 3) state security considerations
do not constitute an obstacle."6 This legal provision is of utmost impor-
tance. This exceptional device practically unties the hands of the Minis-
ter. He can show more flexibility in the matter, since there is no legal
barrier prohibiting him from accepting a foreign majority equity share.
Later, it would be easy for the exception to become the rule. Accord-
ingly, it was declared by Polish sources at the end of 1987 that "[a]t first
the state insisted on securing 51 percent of shares in each venture for
itself but beginning with 1988, however, it will accept minority
157 Id. at preamble.
158 1985 Principles, supra note 52, para. 1.4(a), at 13.
159 1982 Law, supra note 44, art. 1, paras. 1, 2.
160 EAST-WEST JOINT VENTURES, supra note 47, at 25-26.
161 1982 Law, supra note 44, art. 15.
162 Piontek, supra note 79, at 237; Rajski 1985, supra note 86, at 222; EAST-WEST JOINT VEN-
TURES, supra note 47, at 45.
163 A. BURZYNSKI, supra note 47, art. 8, para. 1, at 15.
164 Id. art. 8, para. 2.
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shares.", 165
Furthermore, the same Polish source remarked that "Western busi-
nessmen do not become owners of the joint ventures but act as partners
in them. Moreover, the ventures have to operate under the regulations
applicable in Poland. All in all, there is no danger of the economy being
taken over by foreign capitalists." 1 66
It is evident that the host countries can always find ways to keep
foreign direct investment on their soil under control. The majority eq-
uity share owned by nationals of the country does not in itself constitute
a specific guarantee. Equity share is just a way to divide investment and
to share risks and profits accordingly. The fifty-one percent majority
share owned by the host country is more a question of theoretical princi-
ple than a question of true substance.
It is unfortunate that no such exceptional legal provision exists in
the Soviet Decree No. 49 and the Czechoslovak 1985 Principles. Soviet
legislation is expected to change, though. Consequently, "the current re-
quirement that Soviet partners control at least 51 percent of the equity
under Decree No. 49 can be dropped." 
167
B. The Problem of Capital Contribution Valuation
Economies of socialist countries do not have market pricing, which
would not be arbitrarily implemented by the state in order to fulfill state
policy goals, but would reflect real market values in accordance with
world market prices. It is therefore extremely problematic to valuate a
socialist country's contributions to the joint venture's capital. In con-
trast, Western contributions into the new joint venture can be evaluated
in world market prices, for their prices are governed by manufacturing
costs or potential profitability.1 68
Contribution can take the form of tangible or intangible assets such
as equipment, machinery, technology, trademarks, patents and other in-
dustrial property rights, services, leases, and estate property, and of
course, cash. An enumeration of possible contributions is undertaken by
Soviet legislation in paragraph 27 of Decree No. 48 and in paragraph 11
of Decree No. 49. The enumeration is almost identical in the two De-
crees and includes "buildings, structures, equipment and other assets,
rights to use land, water and other natural resources, buildings, struc-
165 Foreign Capital in Poland, 21 CONTEMP. POLAND No. 1, at 12 (1988).
166 Id. at 13.
167 Feder, supra note 147, at D5, col. 3.
168 On the issue of valuation of capital contribution in practice, see Handling Difficulties in
Evaluating JVInputs, XVI Business Eastern Europe (Business International S.A.) No. 33, at 257-58
(Aug. 17, 1987); see also JVs with the Soviet" More Problems Appear, XVII Business Eastern Europe
(Business International S.A.) No. 20, at 153-54 (May 16, 1988).
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tures and equipment, as well as other proprietary rights [including rights
to work inventions and to use expertise], [and] money assets." 169 The
only difference lies in the monetary form of assets. Under both Decrees,
monetary contributions can be in the currencies of the partners' countries
and in freely convertible currency. Under Decree No. 48 they can also
be in transferable rubles. 170
The Czechoslovak Principles list only the kind of foreign invest-
ment; they do not deal with Czechoslovak inputs. According to chapter
I, section 4, item (c) of the 1985 Principles, "the foreign investment may
consist of machinery and equipment, things material determined in kind,
documentation, technological process, inventions, know-how, technical
personnel [staff] or financial means."' 17 Foreign contributions are char-
acterized as "practically everything having a property value."' 172 It has
been noted that the participants are expected to agree on the value of the
share contributed. 173 Consequently, regulation by the Principles is
vague, since no pattern such as world market prices is provided. Every-
thing depends on the parties involved.
The Polish 1982 Law enumerates possible capital inputs. Foreign
contribution may consist of fixed capital assets, materials and industrial
property rights. 74 The same regulation applies to Polish partners, pro-
vided of course, that the enterprise will be mixed. 71
The Law requires that minimum foreign investment contribution
cannot be lower than the minimum founding deposit.'76 Interestingly,
the 1982 Law establishes a minimum contribution but not the way of
valuation of nonpecuniary contribution. Valuation of intangible assets is
regulated by Order of the Minister of Finance of November 16, 1982
"Concerning the Detailed Principles for Establishing the Value of Invest-
ment Contributions of Foreign Economic Entities in Small Industry and
the Surplus of Export Income Over Import Expenditures."' 77
The 1986 Law defines contributions in a very simple way: they are
either cash or in kind.' 78  Polish partners contribute only in kind.179
Among the types of contributions in kind, the possibility of leasing state-
169 Decree No. 48, supra note 65, para. 27; Decree No. 49, supra note 66, para. 11.
170 Id. On the transferable ruble, see Transferable Ruble - A Fiction, Soviets Admit, XVI Busi-
ness Eastern Europe (Business International S.A.) No. 24, at 189 (June 15, 1987).
171 1985 Principles, supra note 52, para. 1.4(c), at 13.
172 Id. at 6.
173 Id.
174 1982 Law, supra note 44, art. 12, paras. 1, 2.
175 Id. art. 7, para. 1.
176 Id. art. 12, para. 3. See id. art. 16; Arnoldi, supra note 38 (discussing the requirement of
paying a founding deposit).
177 Rajski in YEARBOOK, supra note 34, at 165.
178 A. BURZYNSKI, supra note 47, art. 15, para. 1, at 18.
179 Id. art. 15, para. 3, at 18.
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owned real property to the joint venture is clearly contemplated.18 ° Fur-
thermore, the 1986 Law contains the provision that "the value and na-
ture of contributions in kind are specified in contract or other founding
documents of the company."' 81 It is thereby implied that this is a matter
to be agreed upon by the prospective partners. But the state reserves the
right to verify the value of inputs by independent experts before it grants
the necessary permit. 182
All three pieces of legislation seem to turn upon the same issue:
How can mutual agreement be achieved on setting a certain value and
price for a contribution to the capital of the joint venture? The strategy
used by the host country appears to be to overpricing its inputs, espe-
cially land and buildings. The foreign side seems to use the same tactic
correspondingly, so that the level is adequate and equal in practice.
183
C. Leasing of Immovable Property in the Territory
of the Host Countries
Estate property is a specific case of contribution in kind to the joint
venture's capital. Since discussion is about establishment of a business
on the host country's soil, this kind of contribution concerns the Eastern
European partner.
In every socialist state, "land may not be available for private own-
ership, let alone for foreign private ownership."' 184 Every arrangement
involves a state concession. Therefore, the foreign investor can only use
and not acquire any kind of estate property. That is why estate input
usually constitutes the most common kind of contribution by the Eastern
European party.
But in this case the issue of valuation reemerges because local inves-
tors tend to overvaluate real property on the negotiating table. 85 In
most cases this is not accepted by the Western side. Consequently, it was
suggested that, "instead of capitalizing the property, the solution seems
to be to let the Soviet [local] partner arrange for the land, but offering
[sic] it to the JV on a rental basis."' 86 Presumably, an arrangement can
be reached more readily in the framework of a lease.
18O On the issue of leasing of immoveable property, see the discussion in section IV(C) of this
Article.
181 A. BURZYNSKI, supra note 47, art. 15, para. 4, at 18.
182 Id.
183 See Handling Difflculties in Evaluating JV Inputs, supra note 168, at 257-58 (discussing
overvaluation as both a solution and a dangerous device).
184 Buxbaum, Legal Issues Concerning the Financial Aspects of Joint Ventures with Nonmarket
Economy Firms 2 ICSID-FREIGN INVESTMENT L. J. No. 1, at 66, 69 (1987).
185 JVs with the Soviets." More Problems Appear, supra note 168, at 154; Buzescu, supra note 3 1,
at 424.
186 JVs With the Soviets: More Problems Appear, supra note 168, at 154.
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Recently, Soviet lawyers have completed rules for valuating the land
used by the joint venture.18 7 It remains to be seen whether this new de-
vice will be accepted by prospective investors and how it will be practi-
cally implemented.
The problem of land contribution is addressed by the Soviet legisla-
tion. Jerome A. Cohen stresses the constitutional problems which might
occur in this regard."' 8 This author does not share this view. One of the
reasons underlying the adoption of Decree No. 6362 at the high level of
the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet instead of the USSR Council
of Ministers was to settle this issue. 89 More specifically, as the Decree
stipulates, "[1]and, entrails of the earth, water resources, and forest may
be made available for use to joint ventures as for payment as well as free
of charge."' 9 ° In a second stage Decree Nos. 48 and 49 include land and
estate property on the list of possible contributions to the authorized
fund of the joint venture as was discussed in the previous section.' 9'
The Czechoslovak Principles remain silent on this issue. They do
not deal with contributions by local partners. Therefore, this is a ques-
tion to be agreed upon by the parties. 192
The Polish 1982 Law contains no special provision about land or
other real estate except the general provision on contributions. 93 Con-
versely, the 1986 Law specifies that "[s]tate real property may be leased
to the company upon the approval of a proper local administrative au-
thority.' ' 194 It is to be noted here that, according to the Law of April 29,
1985 "On Land Management and Expropriation of Realties," mere con-
tribution of the right to use state-owned land by the Polish partner to a
company - therefore also to a joint venture - is insufficient grounds for
the company to use the real estate. An appropriate decision of the rele-
vant local organ of state administration is essential. 95 In this manner,
state control of this facet of means of production is satisfied through its
appropriate agency. Consequently, no constitutional issue is raised
through application of this device.
D. Granting of Bank Credits
It is true that no joint venture can engage in productive activity
187 Feder, supra note 147.
188 Cohen, supra note 70, at 169-70.
189 On constitutional aspects which led to adoption of Decree No. 6362, see the discussion in
section III(B) of this Article.
190 Decree No. 6362-XI, supra note 64, para. 4.
191 Decree No. 48, supra note 65, para. 27; Decree No. 49, supra note 66, para. 11.
192 1985 Principles, supra note 52, at 6 and para. 1.4(c), at 13.
193 1982 Law, supra note 44, art. 12, paras. 1, 2 and art. 7, para. 1.
194 A. BURZYNSKI, supra note 47, art. 15, para. 3, at 18.
195 Piontek, supra note 79, at 312.
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without capital contributions. But in most cases initial inputs are not
sufficient. Thus, the role of bank credits, which are to be granted to the
joint venture at its creation or during subsequent operation, becomes cru-
cial. All three legislative schemes under study provide for financing of
the joint venture.
Under the Soviet system, Decree No. 48 stipulates that intra-
Comecon joint ventures may be granted credits by the following banks.
First, credits may be granted in rubles by the USSR State Bank and the
USSR Bank for Industrial Construction. 196 The terms under which
these credits can be granted should, "be at least as favorable to [sic] those
given" to comparable Soviet state-owned organizations. 197 It is notewor-
thy that in this respect Comecon joint ventures are favorably treated, like
similar Soviet state enterprises, under the principle of pursued intensifica-
tion of intra-Comecon integration. Second, credits may be granted in
transferable rubles or in foreign currencies by the USSR Bank for For-
eign Economic Affairs (Vneshekonombank), the two Comecon banks
(International Investment Bank and International Bank for Economic
Cooperation), or by foreign banks or firms with the consent of Vnesheko-
nombank. 198 In this case credits are granted on commercial terms.
The approach of Decree No. 49 is purely commercial. It simply
states that a joint venture may use credits on commercial terms, if neces-
sary. Credits are granted in this case: "in foreign currency - from the
USSR Bank for Foreign Trade [Economic Affairs] or, with its consent
from other foreign banks and firms;"' 199 or "in rubles - from the USSR
State Bank or the USSR Bank for Foreign Trade [Economic Affairs]." 20 0
A few months after adoption of the Soviet joint venture legislation,
Gosbank and Vneshtorgbank jointly adopted an Executive Order which
regulates the procedures for granting credit to joint ventures and for set-
tlement of accounts, as well as repayment of credits by the joint ven-
196 The USSR Bank for Industrial Construction (Promstroibank) replaced in the second half of
1987 the USSR Bank for Construction. U.S.S.R. at Midyear: Trade Down, Outlook Bleak, XVI
Business Eastern Europe (Business International S.A.) No. 35, at 273-74 (Aug. 31, 1987).
197 Decree No. 48, supra note 65, para. 34.
198 Id. During the second half of 1987, the Soviet banking system was reorganized on sectorial
specialization principles. Five specialized banks were established: the USSR Bank for Foreign Eco-
nomic Affairs (Vneshekonombank); the USSR Bank for Industrial Construction (Promstroibank);
the USSR Bank for Wage, Savings and Population Credit; the USSR Agroindustrial Bank
(Agroprombank); and the USSR Bank for Housing, Municipal and Social Development (Zhilsot-
sbank). The sixth bank, the USSR State Bank (Gosbank) heads the entire banking system.
Rozhdov, The US.S.R. Banking Reform, FOREIGN TRADE No. 3, at 40 (Eng. ed. 1988); U.S.S.R. at
Midyear Trade Down, Outlook Bleak, supra note 196; Ivanov, Vneshtorgbank of the U.S.S.R. and
Restructuring of the Mechanism of Foreign Economic Activities, FOREIGN TRADE No. 11, at 4, 5-6
(Eng. ed. 1987).
199 Decree No. 49, supra note 66, para. 27. See generally Ivanov, supra note 198, at 8, 11
(stating that Vneshekonombank usually grants foreign currency credits for a period of four years).
200 Decree No. 49, supra note 66, para. 27.
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tures201 On the issue of how Vneshekonombank or other Soviet banks
are able to grant credits, especially in hard currency, the solution is rela-
tively simple. Besides available Soviet state hard currency funds,
Vneshekonombank borrows hard currency from Western banks.
In the beginning, the Western bank approach was cautious. But
gradually, the interest in lending to joint ventures, especially in the
USSR, picked up noticeably and overcame the risk factor. 2  In 1987,
"Credit Lyonnais (France) [was] in fact, one of several European banks
having set up a joint task force with [the former] Vneshtorgbank and
Gosbank to discuss the establishment of a JV bank in the USSR for pos-
sible lending to East-West JVs. ' '2 3 "The agreement was signed in early
March of 1988 between Credit Lyonnais, leading a syndicate of Western
banks, ' 2°4 and Vneshekonombank. The object of the agreement was an
eight-year, one hundred fifty million-dollar ($150,000,000 U.S.) loan. 0 5
In this way, Vneshekonombank started granting credits to joint ven-
tures established under the terms of Decree No. 49. The financing of the
Italian FATA group was reported as a first case.2 °6 Under the terms of
the protocol each side would be required "to invest only 12 percent ini-
tially. ' '2 °7 The remaining seventy-six percent of the founding capital
would be lent by Vneshekonombank to the new joint venture itself.208
This large-scale credit was finally granted to "Sovitalprodmash," the new
joint venture, by both Vneshekonombank and Mediocredito, an Italian
bank.20 9 Furthermore, in April of 1988 "Svenska Handelsbanken, Swe-
den's third largest commercial bank ... signed an agreement with four
Soviet banks aimed at developing and financing Swedish-Soviet joint ven-
ture projects. '21 0 The agreement was signed with Vneshekonombank,
201 Executive Order of the State Bank of the U.S.S.R. and the Bank for Foreign Trade of the
U.S.S.R. of 22 September 1987 on the Procedure for Crediting to and Settlement of Accounts of Joint
Ventures, International Amalgamations and Organizations of the U.S.S.R. and Other Member-Coun-
tries of CMEA and of Joint Ventures with the Participation of Soviet Organizations and Firms from
Capitalist and Developing Countries, reprinted in UNITED NATIONS CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL
CORPORATIONS, JOINT VENTURES AS A FORM OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION 177
(1988).
202 Financing JVs Who Bears the Risk?, XVI Business Eastern Europe (Business International
S.A.) No. 29, at 229 (July 20, 1987).
203 Id.
204 Focus on Financing: U.S.S.R., XVII Business Eastern Europe (Business International S.A.)
No. 10, at 80 (Mar. 7, 1988).
205 Id.
206 Listed as joint venture number 29 in Details of Joint Ventures in the Soviet Union, XVII
Business Eastern Europe (Business International S.A.) No. 18, at 137, 141 (May 2, 1988).
207 Focus on Financing: U.S.S.R., supra note 204.
208 Id. See also EAST-WEST JOINT VENTURES, supra note 47, at 56.
209 1. IVANOV, JOINT VENTURES IN THE U.S.S.R: LESSONS OF THE FIRST YEAR 2 (1988).
210 Webb, Bank Pact to Boost Joint Soviet-Swedish Ventures, Fin. Times (London), Apr. 12,
1988, at 9.
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Promstroibank, Agroprombank and Zhilsotsbank. 2" As can be seen, a
number of Soviet banks, besides Vneshekonombank, are interested in be-
coming involved in financing joint ventures.
In April 1988, another joint venture was created between British
and Soviet companies to modernize two large petrochemical plants in the
Soviet Union. The different element of this joint venture is the method of
financing. "Virtually all the initial financing will be provided from
outside the Soviet Union through [the banks] Morgan Grenfell and Mos-
cow Narodny Bank Limited." '212
As demonstrated from the above examples, Western interest in fi-
nancing is growing. Comecon's International Investment Bank is also
offering financial assistance to a joint venture for the first time; benefited
will be the Plovdiv-based Bulgarian-Soviet Avtoelektronika joint ven-
ture.213 The Bank also envisages granting credits to East-West joint ven-
tures, as reported by Business Eastern Europe in May 1988.214
The Czechoslovak Principles determine conditions for credit grant-
ing in the Chapter on Foreign Currency Rules. They stipulate that the
needs of the common company for foreign currencies will be covered by
means of credits.215 Yet, the company is not included in the country's
foreign currency plan. The credits will be taken from Czechoslovak for-
eign currency banks, or from foreign companies under conditions cur-
rently granted to foreign applicants.216 In this context, it is apparent that
the joint venture is considered a Czechoslovak resident company,2" 7 yet
at the same time, it is isolated and treated like a foreign company. The
approach undertaken towards the company is cautious and reserved.
The credit grants will be governed by the applicable Czechoslovak
rules. But, at the same time, the Czechoslovak State Bank is authorized
to allow deviation from and exception to these rules,218 which in itself is
a sign of flexibility.
Credit regulation is defined in a specific chapter of the 1982 Polish
Law.21 Such treatment reflects the importance attributed to foreign en-
terprises at the time the Law was adopted. The Law stipulates that oper-
ating and investment credits are available to the enterprises from Polish
211 Id.; Ivanov, supra note 198.
212 Peel & Taylor, UK.-Soviet Deal Signed to Modernize Chemical Products, Fin. Times
(London), Apr. 16, 1988, at 2; Pfeffer, supra note 14.
213 Comecon Bank Will Support Major Investment Projects, XVII Business Eastern Europe
(Business International S.A.) No. 22, at 171 (May 30, 1988).
214 Id. at 172.
215 1985 Principles, supra note 52, para. 11.8.1(b), at 17.
216 Id.
217 Id. para. II.8.1(a), at 17.
218 Id. para. II.9.1, at 17.
219 1982 Law, supra note 44, arts. 28-29.
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or foreign banks.2 2 ° They are granted on the grounds of an agreement
and according to principles determined by the Council of Ministers.2 2 '
The significance of foreign enterprises is again shown, since the condi-
tions for granting a credit are not set up by the State local authorities at
the voivodship (provincial) level, but by the Council of Ministers itself.
Under the 1986 Law the treatment is equally favorable. By virtue of
paragraphs 2 and 4 of article 24, the terms under which credits are
granted are equivalent to those applicable to state enterprises. They con-
stitute the object of a contract finalized between the joint venture and the
bank. Credits from foreign banks can be obtained with the permission of
the bank in which the common company maintains its accounts. 22 2 It
should be noted at this point, that with respect to credits, the treatment is
more favorable than that provided for by Soviet legislation. The
equivalent application of the relevant rules set for state enterprises is
guaranteed regardless of the origin of the joint venture's partners and the
currency in which credits are granted.
V. MANAGEMENT AND PERSONNEL
A. Holding of Corporate Bodies' Key Positions by Host Countries'
Nationals
Appropriate management of the joint venture constitutes the core of
success for its operating activities. "By and large the structure of the
corporate organs is similar to that of Western corporations." '223 Usually
the structure of the joint venture is organized into a two-level scheme,
comprising the highest control organ and the everyday business
management.
One of the main preoccupations of Eastern European countries has
always been that their nationals have substantial participation in the
management bodies and, most importantly, that they hold key positions.
This is understood as an expression of their preoccupation to substan-
tially control the joint venture so that its activities do not contradict the
interests of the socialist state. However, this approach does not consti-
tute a general rule. For instance, Hungarian joint venture legislation
"sets no nationality requirements for the members of the corporate bod-
ies of the joint venture company. ' 224
In the three jurisdictions examined in this Article, there is such a
requirement. But there are exceptions. Soviet Decree No. 48 provides
for two management bodies: the Board, at the highest governing level,
220 Id.
221 Id.
222 A. BURZYNSKI, supra note 47, art. 24, paras. 2, 4, at 19-20.
223 EAST-WEST JOINT VENTURES, supra note 47, at 63.
224 Id.
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and the Management, for day-to-day operational activities. Both bodies
are composed of nationals of the two CMEA member-countries. Yet, it
is provided in the Decree that only the Director General should be a
Soviet citizen.22 Therefore, the Chairman of the Board can be a citizen
of the other CMEA member-country or countries taking part in the
venture.
This is not the case under Decree No. 49. By stipulation of para-
graph 21, this Decree specifies that both "[t]he Chairman of the Board
and the Director-General [should] be citizens of the USSR." '2 2 6
The Czechoslovak Principles follow a similar path, with a slight
deviation. The Principles do not define the corporate bodies at all. They
leave this issue to the decision of the parties involved. Chapter I, section
6 of the Principles, however, contains only one provision, "that the pre-
siding members in such bodies [should] be only Czechoslovak
nationals." '227
The Czechoslovak side argued that this provision should not create
unsurpassable difficulties in practice. Frantisek Fisera remarked:
Speaking openly, many foreign investors fear that their right to
participate in the management of the company will be a formal right
only. Once more, I think it fit to stress that it is up to the parties
themselves to regulate not only by legal but also by factual means their
relations. 228
In other words, everything in the relationship is negotiable at this point
since its implementation depends on the agreed terms of the founding
contract.
Approaches undertaken by the Polish legislation are different in the
1982 and 1986 Laws. Under the 1982 Law, it is unnecessary to discuss
Polish participation in managing the enterprise, since the enterprise may
be entirely foreign-owned. But if a mixed enterprise is set up, its govern-
ance and management must be agreed on by the partners. The only
mandatory provision is the applicability of the relevant regulatory frame-
work in force in Poland.229 Here again, recourse is made to the provi-
sions of the 1934 Commercial Code.
The 1986 Law approach is entirely different. Presumably, this is
justified by its larger scope of application. More specifically, article 17
stipulates that the Company's Manager or, in the case of a Board of
Management, its President, must be a Polish citizen, residing perma-
225 Decree No. 48, supra note 65, para. 16.
226 Decree No. 49, supra note 66, para. 21.
227 1985 Principles, supra note 52, para. 1.6, at 14.
228 Fisera, supra note 54, at 7.
229 1982 Law, supra note 44, art. 21.
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nently in Poland.23° For the rest, "matters of internal operation [are] to
be left up to agreements between partners. '231
In every country, effectiveness and flexibility of the managing frame-
work are key to a successful joint venture. In socialist countries, man-
agement and marketing skills are more than indispensable within a
"cadre of managers, whose markets have always been guaranteed and
whose leeway to manage was sharply circumscribed. ' 232 There is a two-
fold remedy to this problem: establishment of Western marketing advi-
sory firms in the host socialist country, and training of local managers in
the West. In addition, legal services provided by Western or Eastern
specialists in business law will be extremely helpful.
At least in the Soviet Union, all of the above remedies seem to be
working already. First, the Soviets recognized that foreign advisory
firms constitute "the fastest way to bring new ideas and broader experi-
ence into the trade structure. ' 233 Consequently, these firms "are now
welcome to set up offices in the USSR., 2 34 Second, at the beginning of
May 1988, a Russian delegation under Evgeni K. Smitnitsky, Rector of
the Academy of National Economy in Moscow, visited some of the
schools in the United States to examine on location how Americans are
trained in management and marketing. 235
In regard to legal services, the first foreign law firm was expected to
open an office in Moscow in February 1988.236 The Moscow City Bar
Association intends to send Soviet lawyers abroad to spend time in West-
ern firms. Accordingly, the head of the MCBA declared in June 1988,
that the possibility of establishing joint ventures between Soviet and for-
eign attorneys might soon be available.2 37
B. Application of the Unanimity Principle in Decisions
The next issue to be examined is the way in which foreign investors
can play an influential role in the activities of joint ventures. Both Soviet
Decree Nos. 48 and 49 require that the joint venture's statute specify
"the decision-making procedure and the range of issues to be unani-
230 A. BURZYNSKI, supra note 47, art. 17, at 19.
231 Id. art. 16, at 18; see also Arnoldi, supra note 38, at 116.
232 Barringer, Soviet Calls for US. Trade Treaty, N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1988, at D8, col. 6.
233 Soviets Seeking Advisors for Management Guidance, XVI Business Eastern Europe (Busi-
ness International S.A.) No. 47, at 371-72 (Nov. 23, 1987).
234 Id.
235 Daniels, Now Russia Wants to Learn The Way U.S. Managers Do, N.Y. Times, May 2,
1988, at D1, col. I and D12, col. 4.
236 Kaletsky, New York Law Firm to Open Office in Moscow, Fin. Times (London), Jan. 15,
1988, at 5.
237 Carr, Soviet Lawyers Embrace Perestroika, 7 INT'L FIN. L. REV. 6-8 (1988).
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mously settled."23 This provision safeguards foreign investors' rights
and interests. The principle of simple or enforced majority can, of
course, be agreed upon for selected issues in the founding documents of
the venture.
The Czechoslovak 1,985 Principles provide "that the articles of in-
corporation of the joint venture company must ensure a reasonable par-
ticipation of the foreign [participant] in the management, production and
sale of the organization." '239 This Czechoslovak provision is unique in its
nature among CMEA member-countries' joint venture legislation.2'
Remaining issues of organization are left to the parties to decide.
Polish legislation remains silent on the point. Presumably, the flexi-
ble approach of both Polish laws implies that organization is a matter of
mutual agreement as well. This understanding applies when the subject
is a common company - i.e., a mixed enterprise of the 1982 Law, or a
joint venture of the 1986 Law. Obviously, it has no substantial value in a
wholly foreign-owned Polonian enterprise.
The 1986 Law contains only one restriction. The parties cannot al-
ter the proportion of their shares in the company and thereby affect the
basis under which their profits are distributed.24
Many practical ways have been suggested as to how the foreign in-
vestor can influence critical decisions and control the operation of the
joint venture in an Eastern European country without holding a majority
share.242 Control can be secured through special terms in the joint ven-
ture's statute. The terms can include, among others: requiring unani-
mous voting for crucial issues such as adding partners, proportionally
increasing the equity capital, or liquidating the company; and providing
for issuance of two categories of shares with different voting rights which
enable the foreign partner to select specific executives in key positions, as
is the case occasionally in Western companies.243 However, the local na-
tional can usually find ways to facilitate the joint venture operation better
than a foreigner can. Consequently, Western businessmen would have an
interest in employing a local manager anyway, if they had the choice.2 "
The functionability of management schemes was characteristically
underlined in January 1988 by Ivan D. Ivanov:
238 Decree No. 48, supra note 65, par. 8; Decree No. 49, supra note 66, para. 7.
239 EAST-WEST JoiNT VENTURES, supra note 47, at 63. See also 1985 Principles, supra note
52, para. 1.4(b), at 13.
240 EAST-WEST JOINT VENTURES, supra note 47, at 63.
241 A. BURZYNSKI, supra note 47, art. 19, para. 5, at 19; Piontek, supra note 79, at 313.
242 Controlling the JV Without a Majority Share, XVI Business Eastern Europe (Business In-
ternational S.A.) No. 31, at 243 (Aug. 3, 1987); EAsT-WEsT JoI Nr VENTURES, supra note 47, at 46;
Feder, supra note 147; Buzescu, supra note 31, at 428.
243 Controlling the JV Without a Majority Share, supra note 242, at 243.
244 Id.
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The fears that 51 percent of the capital reserved for the Soviet side
will lead to its "dictatorship in management" have proven to be
groundless. In all joint ventures there are foreign members of the
board of directors supervising quality inspection, efforts, technical poli-
cies and so forth. 245
C. Obligatory Applicability of Host Countries' Labor Laws
Every potential foreign investor's primary objective in an Eastern
European country is to utilize the local labor force to satisfy the person-
nel needs of the joint venture. Workers in these countries are relatively
well-trained, although they receive lower pay than those in the West.2'
Despite the fact that remuneration paid to local skilled workers is often
higher than normally applicable to state enterprises, the cost is still low.
Employment is in accordance with host countries' policies with re-
spect to adequate use of local workers. Utilization of foreign workers is
considered exceptional and must be justified under the specific situation.
Regarding workers, Decree Nos. 48 and 49 differ slightly. Decree
No. 48 stipulates that matters of pay, routine of work and recreation,
social security, and social insurance will be governed by Soviet regula-
tion, regardless of the employee's national origin. The sole exception
provided by the Decree is any contrary provision by interstate or inter-
governmental treaties to which the USSR is a party.24 7
Decree No. 49 adopts the same approach for the above matters but
leaves matters of pay, leave, and pension of foreign employees to be regu-
lated by the individually signed contracts with the employees in ques-
tion.248 Furthermore, the Decree bears an express provision that "[t]he
personnel of joint ventures shall consist mainly of Soviet citizens."249
"According to Soviet interpretation, this means that foreign employees
can be used normally in highly qualified posts."25 This provision is not
included in Decree No. 48. Within the spirit of this Decree Soviet citi-
zens and citizens of other CMEA member-countries are treated
equally.251
The Czechoslovak Principles adopt a similar approach. The general
applicability of Czechoslovak legislation is secured for persons employed
by the joint ventures252 with respect to wages and labor relations 253 as
245 1. IVANOV, supra note 209, at 1.
246 Arnoldi, supra note 38, at 41, 99.
247 Decree No. 48, supra note 65, para. 57.
248 Decree No. 49, supra note 66, para. 48.
249 Id. para. 47.
250 EAST-WEST JOINT VENTURES, supra note 47, at 66.
251 Decree No. 48, supra note 65, para. 57.
252 1985 Principles, supra note 52, para. I1.10.1, at 18.
253 Id. para. 11.10.2, at 18.
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well as social security and pension retirement schemes.2 54 Necessary de-
viations therefrom will be allowed by the Federal Ministry of Labor and
Social Matters.255 The reason underlying this provision is "to avoid
some discrepancies in legal regulations of Czechoslovakia and the coun-
tries the nationals of which will take part in the activities of the joint
venture., 256 Therefore, the Principles demonstrate flexibility in this
respect.
The Polish 1982 Law contains two rather general provisions. The
first is that enterprises will utilize labor resources according to the princi-
ples laid down by the Council of Ministers,2" 7 and the second is that
regulation of the Polish Labor Code will apply to labor relations in enter-
prises.258 The latter is mandatory, and the wording of the former was
left vague purposely to both facilitate negotiations and implement state
policy depending on specific cases.
The approach of the 1986 Law is more detailed, and is explicitly
restrictive like Soviet Decree No. 49. It stipulates that foreign citizens
may be employed as justified by their special qualifications. But the Law
uses wording different than that in Soviet Decree No. 49. The wording is
conversed. Therefore, instead of stipulating the prevalence of local em-
ployees, it renders the utilization of foreign employees exceptional.
Moreover, their utilization is subject to the consent of the State local
administrative authority at the voivodship (provincial) level.259 The obli-
gatory application of Polish Labor Law is also provided on a general
basis.260
A final remark regarding the labor force is that only the Polish 1986
Law stipulates creation of a supervisory council in conformity with the
West German model of the Aufsichtsrat (supervisory council).2 61 Under
this model, the company's employees elect one member of the council
who may also be one of the company's employees.262 This policy consti-
tutes a concrete departure from articles 207 and 378 of the 1934 Com-
mercial Code which clearly precluded "the possibility of [a] company['s]
employees becoming members of the supervisory board. '263 Thus, the
posture of the company's employees is considerably enhanced.
254 Id. para. 11.10.3, at 18.
255 Id. para. 11.10.2, at 18.
256 Id. at 11.
257 1982 Law, supra note 44, art. 22, para. 1.
258 Id. art. 22, para. 2.
259 A. BURZYNSKI, supra note 47, art. 32, para. 3, at 24.
260 Id. art. 32, para. 1, at 24.
261 Id. art. 18, para. 1, at 19.
262 Id. art. 18, para. 2, at 19.
263 Piontek, supra note 79, at 300.
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VI. TAXATION AND CUSTOMS FRAMEWORK
A. Exemption from Customs Duties and Taxes During the Initial
Operating Period
Financial regulation of the joint venture's activities is one of the
most crucial matters, for no potential foreign investor undertakes such
involvement without favorable terms in this area.
The first issue to be considered is the possibility of tax and customs
duties exemption during the initial operating period of the company. It
is normally expected that the new joint venture will be granted a tax
holiday during the first years of its activities. A certain degree of exemp-
tion from paying customs duties during the initial period is also normally
expected.
The legislation of each of the three countries treats this subject in a
different way. The Soviet legislation grants tax relief to the joint ventures
for their initial two years of operation. The legislative approach is identi-
cal in both Decree Nos. 48 and 49.2"
A problem of discerning the beginning of the tax holiday occurred
because a great deal of time could elapse between the time of a com-
pany's registration with the Ministry of Finance and its becoming fully
operational. The Soviet authorities recognized this problem soon after
enactment of the initial legislation. Decree No. 1074 was enacted, among
other things, to modify the relevant provision. Now the tax exemption
will be granted "during the first two years from the moment of showing
declared profits." '265
Besides this exemption, another important exemption is provided by
Decree No. 49. Equipment, materials and other property imported into
the country by the foreign partners as their contribution to the author-
ized capital of the joint venture are exempt from customs duties regard-
less of the time when these items are imported.266 An equivalent
provision is not found in Decree No. 48, presumably because these types
of relations are regulated between CMEA member-countries through bi-
lateral or multilateral intra-Comecon agreements.
Obviously, the customs duties exemption is a major incentive for
foreigners to import high-quality equipment and advanced-technology
machinery for the operational needs of the joint venture. The approach
of Soviet legislation in this respect is very flexible and motivating. The
relevant provisions can be characterized as creating incentives.
The Polish approach is favorable enough in the context of tax ex-
emption, but to a lesser extent than the Soviet approach. The 1982 Law
264 Decree No. 48, supra note 65, para. 43; Decree No. 49, supra note 66, para. 36.
265 Decree No. 1074, supra note 75, at 189; Smirnov 1988, supra note 96, at 47.
266 Decree No. 49, supra note 66, paras. 10, 13.
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in its original form contained special rules on taxation and exemptions in
articles 26-28. After the amendments introduced by the Tax Law of July
29, 1983, tax exemption is now granted for an initial operation period of
three years. However, exemption is granted in the form of a tax refund,
and is only granted if one third of the income earned during that period
has been reinvested into the operations of the enterprise. z67
The 1986 Law is more attractive in its provisions. All joint ventures
are exempted from income tax during their first two years of activity.
2 68
In comparison to the Soviet legislative provisions this scheme is less
favorable. It resembles the form of Decree Nos. 48 and 49 before their
amendment by Decree No. 1074. Therefore, after the two-year time pe-
riod taxation will be applied regardless of whether profits actually accrue
to the venture. With respect to customs duties, the 1986 Law's approach
is slightly less favorable than the Soviet one. The Law specifies that im-
ported contributions to the company's capital in kind, such as machin-
ery, installations and equipment, and means of transportation, are not
liable to customs duties.2 69 This provision extends to imported machin-
ery, installations and equipment, and means of transportation, acquired
during the first three years.270 Setting this time limit constitutes a less
favorable treatment than that adopted by Soviet legislation, where any
additional contribution to the authorized fund of the joint venture is ex-
empted from customs duties at any time. 71
The approach undertaken by the Czechoslovak Principles is the
most stringent one in the three jurisdictions. No tax incentive whatso-
ever is provided for joint ventures. Moreover, it is clearly stated that
customs duties on imported goods will be collected in any case. The only
relieving provision in this context is the possibility of applying for exemp-
tion of customs duties for a determined period of time. The application
is to be submitted to the Federal Ministry of Foreign Trade which may
grant it "if it thinks it fit."1272
B. Taxation of Profits
Next a comparison can be made of the taxation framework in the
three countries. The basic taxation provision in the Soviet legislation is
to be found in Decree No. 6362. The Decree stipulates that joint ven-
tures will pay tax on profit at the rate and in the order provided for by
the USSR Council of Ministers.2 73 At the same time, it allows the Minis-
267 Piontek, supra note 79, at 323; Arnoldi, supra note 38, at 53.
268 A. BURZYNSKI, supra note 47, art. 30, para. 3, at 23.
269 Id. art. 31, para. 1, item 1, at 23.
270 Id. item 2, at 23.
271 See supra note 267.
272 1985 Principles, supra note 52, para. 1.11, at 18.
273 Decree No. 6362-XI, supra note 64, para. 1.
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try of Finance to reduce the tax rate or to completely exempt from tax
payment individual cases. 274 Furthermore, the Decree specifies the pro-
cedure under which taxes are to be collected. 75
By this authorization of Decree No. 6362, Decree Nos. 48 and 49
determine the tax rate at thirty percent. The tax is due on profits, after
deductions paid to reserve and other funds.276 In addition to this tax,
profits are taxed at an additional twenty percent rate if transferred
abroad. The withholding tax is not collected if a bilateral treaty between
the USSR and the respective foreign state provides otherwise.2 77
The Soviet joint venture tax rate is not extremely high in compari-
son with Western companies' standards. Only the additional twenty per-
cent repatriation withholding tax has been criticized z.27  Besides, the rate
is flexible and negotiable, depending, probably, on the priority attributed
to particular joint venture proposals by the host country.
The analogous framework in Poland is largely contradictory. The
1982 Law is today, after enactment of the 1983 Tax Law, almost prohibi-
tive for foreign investors. The income tax rate is fixed by the Law at the
base level of eighty-five percent.2 79 This income tax rate is the highest in
the world. 8 ' Besides the income tax, other taxes, such as the turnover
tax, apply to Polonian enterprises.28 l It is true that a number of tax ex-
emptions and reliefs somehow alleviate the burden.28 2 Yet, the average
tax rate is about seventy percent,283 which is still extremely high. Under
these conditions, applications for permits to establish an enterprise were
withdrawn and a bad general climate of distrust among Polonian enter-
prises has existed since 1983.284 Conversely, the 1986 Law establishes a
legal framework full of incentives. Its basic tax rate is fixed at fifty per-
cent.285 The rate is moderately high, but the Law provides a unique de-
vice for tax alleviation: "[t]he tax rate is decreased by 0.4 per cent [sic]
for each 1 per cent [sic] of the value of production or services exported by
274 Id. para. 1.
275 Id. para. 2.
276 Decree No. 48, supra note 65, para. 43; Decree No. 49, supra note 66, para. 36.
277 Decree No. 48, supra note 65, para. 48; Decree No. 49, supra note 66, para. 41.
278 In the case of the joint venture Infa-otel, for example, the issue of the 20% withholding tax
made concluding the agreement difficult. Details of Joint Ventures in the Soviet Union, XVII Busi-
ness Eastern Europe (Business International S.A.) No. 17, at 131 (Apr. 25, 1988) (listed as joint
venture number 9); First Soviet JV" Now The Problems Appear, XVI Business Eastern Europe (Busi-
ness International S.A.) No. 17, at 129 (Apr. 27, 1987).
279 Piontek, supra note 79, at 323.
280 Arnoldi, supra note 38, at 54.
281 Rajski 1985, supra note 86, at 225.
282 Piontek, supra note 79, at 323-25.
283 Id. at 325.
284 rd.
285 A. BURZYNSKI, supra note 47, art. 30, para. 2, at 23.
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the company." '86 In other words, if the entire production of the joint
venture is exported, the tax rate goes down to only ten percent. This
provision is unique among similar legislation of socialist countries and
emphasizes the export-oriented character of the recent Polish joint ven-
ture law.
At the other end of the spectrum lies the Czechoslovak legislation.
The 1985 Principles provide for a fifty percent basic tax rate.287 But they
stipulate an additional withholding tax of twenty-five percent on divi-
dends. This additional income taxation is cumulative; and, most impor-
tant, the tax is due whether or not profits are transferred abroad, unless
stipulated otherwise in an international treaty to which the country is a
party.288 It is obvious that the Czechoslovak taxation framework is the
most burdensome of the three countries.
C. Reserve and Other Funds
A feature common to all CMEA member-countries is the reserve
(risk) fund.289 Under most Eastern European legislative frameworks, the
joint venture is an autonomous legal entity, which remains more or less
outside the nationalized sector of the economy. Thus, it is obligated to
create a reserve fund, because the state will not cover any eventual losses.
Besides the reserve fund, a number of other mandatory funds, such as
cultural, scientific, etc., constitute a significant preoccupation of the legis-
lation, and therefore a distinct element of the joint venture structure in
Eastern European countries.290
Both Soviet Decrees regulate the issue of obligatory funds using
identical phrasing.291 They stipulate that agreed deductions from annual
profits will create the capital of the reserve fund. The deductions will
cease to be compulsory as soon as the capital of the reserve fund reaches
twenty-five percent of the authorized fund of the joint venture. This is
the only mandatory provision. Every other matter, like the amount of
annual deductions and the formation and operation of other funds, will
be agreed by the partners and included in the founding documents of the
joint venture.292
Both Decrees provide for deduction of obligatory allocations to the
286 Id.
287 1985 Principles, supra note 52, para. 11.4.1, at 16.
288 Id. para. 11.4.4.
289 EAsT-WEsT JOINT VENTURES, supra note 47, at 57; see also Buzescu, supra note 31, at
424.
290 On the various obligatory funds, see Advice to JV Negotiators Watch Accounting Rules,
XVI Business Eastern Europe (Business International S.A.) No. 30, at 236 (July 27, 1987).
291 Decree No. 48, supra note 65, para. 38; Decree No. 49, supra note 66, para. 30.
292 Id.
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reserve and other funds before profits are taxed.293 This is important
because it reduces the amount of tax to be finally paid and avoids double
taxation of the joint venture.
The Polish 1982 Law provides for creation of the enterprise's social
and housing funds.2 94 There is no provision for a reserve fund, though.
Presumably, this is one of the goals covered by the requirement of paying
an obligatory founding deposit.295
The 1986 Law is simpler in this respect. It stipulates the formation
of only a reserve fund in order to cover possible losses. The annual re-
quired contribution to the fund is ten percent of net profits. Allocations
to the fund may stop once the fund has reached four percent of annual
operating costs.
296
The Czechoslovak Principles still follow the pattern of a multiple
fund structure equivalent to that of state enterprises. Thus, it is provided
that the common company has to create corporate funds "such as [a]
reserve fund, a cultural and social fund, remunerations fund," and cer-
tain other funds. 297 The 1985 Principles do not indicate the sums which
have to be contributed to the funds. It is understood that this is a matter
to be agreed upon by the parties and included in the respective
contract.298
VII. DURATION AND DISSOLUTION
A. Duration: Limited or Unlimited in Time, With or Without
Possibility of Extension?
The issue of the duration of a joint venture should be considered to
be a very delicate one within the context of a socialist economy. Tradi-
tionally, socialist states view joint ventures as exceptional devices. As
such, they should also be of limited duration so that the national soil
would not be ceded to foreign capital. Today, after perestroika, the
above approach seems rather old-fashioned. However, it is still too early
to speak about real integration of the joint venture concept into a state-
controlled economy. Consequently, joint venture legislation still adopts
a cautious approach.
The Soviet Decrees stipulate that joint venture duration is a subject
to be specified by the prospective partners in the founding documents of
293 Decree No. 48, supra note 65, para. 43; Decree No. 49, supra note 66, para. 36; Cohen,
supra note 70, at 177.
294 1982 Law, supra note 44, art. 22, para. 3.
295 Id. art. 16.
296 A. BURZYNSKI, supra note 47, art. 19, para. 4, at 19.
297 1985 Principles, supra note 52, para. II.l.2(b), at 15.
298 Id. at 8.
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the company. 9 9 Consequently, everything can be agreed to freely by the
parties. Yet, it is noteworthy that the Decrees are silent on the issue of
evehtual extension of the operating period. Here lies the key to safe-
guarding the state's interests. Theoretically, the foreign partner can be
forced out at expiration of the operating period. Regardless of the likeli-
hood of this occurring, it is a question of policy to be determined by the
state in the future. But, for the moment, the legal vacuum can lead to
any interpretation. Jerome A. Cohen remarked, "Perhaps the USSR is
being cautious, not wishing to give either its own people on foreign inves-
tors the idea that joint enterprises can be renewed until considerable ex-
perience with them has been obtained." 3"
The Polish approach under the 1982 Law is more liberal. The law
provides for an operating period of up to twenty years, or forty if the
depreciation period is longer. It also provides for issuance of a new per-
mit after expiration of the previous one.3 °1 Most likely, this flexible ap-
proach is possible because the Polonian enterprises operate only within
the framework of the nonsocialized sector of Polish economy, and their
scope is limited to small industry activities.
Conversely, the approach followed by the 1986 Law is similar to
that of the Soviet legislation. The expected duration of the company's
activities should be included in the request to grant a permit for estab-
lishment of the company. 302 The Minister of Foreign Economic Cooper-
ation may accept or reject the duration proposal of the parties, at his
discretion. In any case, the issued permit should prescribe its period of
validity. E. Piontek feels that issuing a permit for a prescribed period
does not imply that it is not renewable. He maintains:
The Law does not introduce any restriction as to the duration of
the permit. The intention of the legislator was that companies set up
under the Law have a permanent character. After the expiry of the
initial permit, "the partner may apply for an extension; providing the
company continues to meet legal requirement, it can rely on a positive
decision regarding the new application. ', 30 3
This might be true. However, a legal vacuum still exists. Only time
will tell how this device will work.
The Czechoslovak legislation is entirely silent on the matter. Pre-
sumably, the issue of duration is a specific issue which finds no place in a
general set of principles such as the 1985 Principles.
299 Decree No. 48, supra note 65, para. 8; Decree No. 49, supra note 66, para. 8.
300 Cohen, supra note 70, at 183.
301 1982 Law, supra note 44, art. 17.
302 A. BURZYNSKI, supra note 47, art. 9, para. 1, item 3, at 16.
303 Piontek, supra note 79, at 316.
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
B. Dissolution, Liquidation and Right of Preemption by Partners
Representing the Host Countries
The issue of dissolution and liquidation is the last to be addressed
with in this Article. Although the joint Yentures are established with
long term perspectives - at least from the point of view of the foreign
investor - the issue of dissolution and the procedure of liquidation
should concern the founding parties even during the negotiating period
before the founding document is signed. Concluding an agreement on
that point also safeguards both parties' interests.
In a number of jurisdictions the obligation to reach an agreement
especially on liquidation procedure, is stipulated by the joint venture leg-
islation. For instance, both Soviet Decrees require that the statute of the
joint venture contain specific provisions about the liquidation procedure,
as agreed by the partners. 3" Furthermore, it is stipulated in the Decrees
that a joint venture may be dissolved in accordance with provisions con-
tained in its founding documents or by decision of the USSR Council of
Ministers, if the venture has exceeded its scope.30 5 This author believes
that for the same legal cause the decentralizing provisions established by
Decree No. 1074 should also apply to dissolution in an analogous way.3 06
It would be the task of the ministries and departments of the USSR and
the Councils of Ministers of the fifteen Union Republics to decide on
dissolution of a joint venture if the latter exceeded its scope.
The Decrees provide, moreover, for a number of procedural mecha-
nisms regarding dissolution and liquidation. These include publication
of a relevant notification in the press, and registration of the dissolution
with the Ministry of Finance. 30 7 They also provide for fair distribution
of the remaining assets of the company, after settlement of eventually
existing obligations.30 8
The Polish 1982 Law refers to parties' agreements on dissolution
and liquidation problems, and to relevant regulations of the Polish Civil
and Commercial Code.30 9 Interestingly, the Law grants a preemption to
rights and assets of the enterprise under liquidation after settlement with
the creditors.310
The regulation of the 1986 Law differs somewhat. It refers to with-
drawal of the permit if the company is involved in illegal activities or
activities beyond its scope. However, the organ which originally granted
304 Decree No. 48, supra note 65, para. 8; Decree No. 49, supra note 66, para. 7.
305 Decree No. 48, supra note 65, para. 61; Decree No. 49, supra note 66, para. 51.
306 Decree No. 1074, supra note 75.
307 Decree No. 48, supra note 65, paras. 61, 63; Decree No. 49, supra note 66, paras. 51, 53.
308 Decree No. 48, supra note 65, para. 62; Decree No. 49, supra note 66, para. 52.
309 1982 Law, supra note 44, art. 37.
310 Id. art. 38.
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the permit specifies a definite period in which the company must cease
such activities. If the company does not comply, the permit is with-
drawn, and an application is submitted to the court for dissolution of the
joint venture.31 The dissolution is pronounced by a court order.312 Also
under the 1986 Law, the Polish partner enjoys the right of preemption in
the event of liquidation, unless otherwise provided by the founding docu-
ments of the joint venture.313
Under the Czechoslovak Principles, the liquidation issue is left to
the discretion of the parties,3" 4 since Czechoslovak law makes no provi-
sion for dissolving a company.31 5
VIII. CONCLUSION
It has become apparent through this comparison of key points of
joint venture legislation in the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Poland
that current legal enactments in these nations are far from being techni-
cally perfect. Differences in legal constructions and in attitudes about
specific issues reflect underlying reasoning and policies of the respective
countries. Changes in existing legislation should assume bolder positions
and comply with pragmatic approaches from the theoretical and practi-
cal points of view. The role of foreign direct investment should be clearly
recognized as one of primordial importance within the framework of cen-
trally planned state economies. Accordingly, the portion of joint ven-
tures and general private investment in domestic economies should be
left to grow larger through more attractive provisions and incentives.
Joint ventures should no longer be considered as alien constructions op-
erating parallel to existing nationalized economy structures; they should
be accepted as important parts of the economies.
The legislation of each of the three countries needs specific improve-
ments. These improvements appear to be coming slowly but steadily.
For example, the Soviet legislation adopted an innovative, flexible and
decentralizing attitude in the form of a positive response to foreign inves-
tors' reactions and criticisms. The new flexible attitude was concretized
in the enactment of Decree No. 1074 which improved a number of
311 A. BURzyNsKI, supra note 47, art. 14, para. 1, at 17-18.
312 Id. art. 14, para. 2.
313 Id. art. 37, at 26.
314 1985 Principles, supra note 52, at 4.
315 Key Provisions of Draft C.S.R. JVLaw, XVI Business Eastern Europe (Business Interna-
tional S.A.) No. 44, at 349 (Nov. 2, 1987). It is expected that all remaining unanswered or problem-
atic issues under the 1985 Principles will be soon settled by the forthcoming Czechoslovak joint
venture code. See also New CSSR JV Code: Some Progress with Tough Issues, XVI Business Eastern
Europe (Business International S.A.) No. 44, at 348-49 (Nov. 2, 1987); C.SS.R. JV Update: Services
Included, XVII Business Eastern Europe (Business International S.A.) No. 18, at 137-38, (May 2,
1988).
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points, as discussed earlier. However, Soviet joint ventures still require
distinct legal structures and capitalization. Moreover, further coordina-
tion between Decree No. 48 and Decree No. 49 should be achieved.
The Polish legislation needs improvement in order to become more
uniform. The 1982 and 1986 Laws should be merged, or if not, more
unifying provisions should be adopted.
Finally, Czechoslovakia should adopt a distinct joint venture code,
instead of the muddled combination of generally nebulous and non-bind-
ing guidelines for foreign investment, which the 1985 Principles contain.
All of the above changes seem to be imminent.316 In addition, the
three countries need:
1) free trade zones, following the Chinese or Hungarian models,
which is likely to occur soon in the Soviet Union and Poland; and,317
2) progressional establishment of convertible national currencies, at
a later stage, in order to reflect real world market prices and values, and
not just state policies.318
These changes presuppose the success of the undertaken structural
domestic economic reforms. Successful implementation of the joint ven-
ture legal framework requires further introduction of market economy
forces and principles into the host countries' nationalized economies.
Clearly, all three countries under discussion are currently going through
a transitional stage, exemplified by recently triggered perestroika and the
316 New C.S.S.R. JV Code: Some Progress with Tough Issues, XVI Business Eastern Europe
(Business International S.A.) No. 44, at 349 (Nov. 2, 1987); see also Polonian Rule Changes Likely to
Delay JVLaw, XVII Business Eastern Europe (Business International S.A.) No. 13, at 99 (Mar. 28,
1988).
317 The idea of exclusive economic zones in the U.S.S.R. is under discussion among Soviet
leaders. This point was raised by Oleg Bogomolov, Director of the Institute of Economics of the
World Socialist System. The Baltic Republics and the Soviet Far East are suggested as appropriate
locations. Peel, Soviet Call for Moves to Boost Joint Ventures, Fin. Times (London), Apr. 21, 1988, at
3. The idea of free trade zones is under discussion also in Poland. Possible locations would be the
Szczecin, Swinoujgcie and Gdynia port areas. Polish Free Trade Zones? Probably, But Be Patient,
XVII Business Eastern Europe (Business International S.A.) No. 2, at 12 (Jan. 11, 1988); Polish Free
Trade Zones Now Closer to Reality, XVII Business Eastern Europe (Business International S.A.) No.
18, at 139 (May 2, 1988).
318 The currencies of the USSR, Czechoslovakia and Poland are not convertible even between
the three countries, nor inside Comecon. Only recently, the USSR and Czechoslovakia signed an
agreement on limited convertibility of their currencies. They were the first CMEA member-coun-
tries to take this step. See Focus on Financing: Czechoslovakia/U.S.S.R., XVII Business Eastern
Europe (Business International S.A.) No. 10, at 80 (Mar. 7, 1988); Colitt, Moscow, Prague Agree
Currency Convertibility, Fin. Times (London), Feb. 29, 1988, at 3. Moreover, Ivan Ivanov, Deputy
Chairman of the State Foreign Economic Commission was one of the Soviet officials to openly dis-
cuss the possibilities and problems involved in free convertibility for the ruble. See Soviets Openly
Discuss Ruble Convertibility, XVII Business Eastern Europe (Business International S.A.) No. 27, at
212 (July 4, 1988). Convertibility of the ruble, together with establishment of a currency market, is
openly discussed in recent Soviet literature. Vasilev, By~li u nas Valjutnomu Rynku? (Will There be
a Currency Market for Us?), Ekonomicheskaja Gazeta, June 1988, No. 26, at 21.
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equivalent restructuring mechanisms in the other countries. It is hoped
that nothing will impede the implementation of these important eco-
nomic and political transformations.
It may be argued that extensive domestic reforms would produce
economic disturbances, such as rising prices within the countries, and
would provoke uncontrollable reactions on the part of ordinary citi-
zens.3 19 But it is hoped that in the long run, vigorous and dynamic econ-
omies will emerge as a result of the proposed changes.
It is clear that as a result of the new conceptions and implemented
legal mechanisms, Eastern Europe now tends to be more open to foreign
business than it ever used to be. Time is needed for the new measures to
be implemented. A positive approach full of understanding is needed;
for, whatever the evolution may be, Chernobyl has proved that it con-
cerns and affects the entire world.
319 As it is widely known, the Polish government lost the referendum of November 29, 1987 on
accelerating economic and political reform. See, eg., Poland: Vote Lost, But Reform Should Con-
tinue, XVII Business Eastern Europe (Business International S.A.) No. 23, at 385 (Dec. 7, 1987).
Moreover, in October 1987, fears and rumors that a rise in prices could occur in the Soviet Union led
to uncontrollable consumer reactions, such as the hoarding of food and other products. Keller,
Russians, Fearing Rise in Prices. Hoard Food, N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1987, at A7, col. 1.

